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INTRODUCTION 
Pu.bl1dt;Y is tJJ~ Vt?~~Y soul {)f_lust.io§ 
It is a fundamental principle of our justice system in Nevv Zealand that t1w 
courts are open to the public, as this is believed to be a necessity in ensuring 
tlle proper administration of justice.i Tlle public administration of justice llas 
come t,:) be seen as a trademark of a democratic soc:1ety . This rlietonc: is 
easily accepted and selclorn questioned, but in fact on closer examination 
there are a number of protAems ~Nith even this simple principle. Some areas 
of la~N in Nevv• Zealand are not coverecl l)y tl1is Pu.l)licity Principle. and 
sr)ecia.list courts have been estabHshed which are to a great extent closed t1.) r- ,..., 
the public. Some devices have been established as exceptions to the principle 
in certain circumstances. Some questions are even more basic - ·what is 
meant by the open and pul)lic administration of justice ancl vv·hy it is so 
important? 
This paper ,,\Till e1m.mine in detail this principle of New Zealand lavv that 
justice in tl1e courts is administered openly and in puNic2. It is not ho· .. vever 
possible tl) examine every facet of tlus pnnc:1ple, or to discuss many ot the 
areas in detail, tlrns t11e paper 'Nill highlight issues of interest. 
This Pu.Nicity Principle v,;,as inllerent in our system, l)Ut has in more recent 
times been a.ttainecl constitutional status In 1966 the General Assembly oi 
the United Nations adopted the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights. Nev,l Zealand signed the Convention in 1966 and ratified it 
ten years later. Tlw Convention creates legal obligations, on tl1e signatories .. 
Nnding m International Lavv, t..:) comply vv11th the vanous artKles, both m 
policy and in legislation) isticle 2 states that one of t11e duties of states who 
1 "General Comments on the International ConYention on Civil and Political 
Rights " Report of the UN Humttr1 Rights C•JmmHtee GAOR.. 198'f.. 39tl1 Session .. 
Supp t{o 40 (A / 39/40) 143. 
2 The paper -v;,ill be limited to en analysis of the publk:ity prindple in the 
courts and ii··ill not cover pretrial proceedings or hearings in Chambers. 
·3 JB Elkind "Applkation of the Internci.tional Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 111 New Zealand." (1981) 7~> AJIL 169 .. 172. 
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are parties to it is "t£J adopt such legislative or other measures as may be 
necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the ... Covenant."4 
Article 14 ( 1) of the Convention states 
All persons shall be equ.:11 before the c:ourts and tribunals. In the 
determination of ar1y cnmina1 charge against him, ot· of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at la"?t, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing by a ·~ompetent, independent and impartial tribunal 
established by la°'l. The Pt·ess e11d the puNic may be exc:luded from all ot· 
pat·t of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (i.,rdrc· puUic) or 
national se(:ut·ity in a democre.tk society, or ··v:rhen the interests of the 
priva.te lives of the parties so requires .. or to the extent strictly necessary 
in the opinion of the c;out·t in special circumstan(:es '?lhet·e publicit~l 
"'fvould pt·ejudice the interests of justice.: t,ut at1y Judgment rendet·ed in a 
(:t'imina1 (:e.se 01· in a suit at lav:r shall be made publk ex,:::ept '\'/here the 
interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings 
coti-:::ern ma.tt·imonie1 disputes or the guardie11ship of c:hildren. 
The paper will analyse ho1vv Nevl Zealand law can be reconciled v,nth Article 
14( 1) and whetl1er this provision creates any obligations which are not being 
fulfilled in Nev,, Zealand at the present time. This is the first of several 
tlwnws v1.'11id1 V-lill be (liscu.ssecl tl1rou.ghout the paper. 
Secondly there will be an analysis of ·whether the publicity concept is 
synonymous in criminal and civil areas. Finally the paper i;;,Jill loot at tl1e 
~Nay that the rationale for t11e pritKiple applies to different areas anci l1ov,1 
exceptions can be JU.stifled 111 areas v,1lwre the ratwnale applies. 
In addition to these general themes the paper aims to explain and highlight 
interesting areas relating to tl1e principle of public justice. the reasons 
behind the principle and the exceptions which are- accepted m Nev,l Zealan(l 
law. The lav,, relating to name suppres~;ion will be examined in detail as 
there are valid arguments that the ratwnale for the principle does not apply 
to it. 
4 Article 2 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 1968 
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The structure of the paper is as f ollo1Ns: 
1) Part One of the paper sets out the general concept.s that v,1111 be used in 
tl1e rest of tl1e paper. This involves exarnining both what is meant by the 
Publicity Principle_. and v,,hy that principle exists Vvithin the judicial system. 
The starting point 1s an analysis oi v1hat is generally meant by the notion oi 
open and pul)lic hearings in the administration of justice. This concept will 
incorporate Article 14_. present New Zealand statutory law and some judicial 
statements from the principal cases in the area. The paper tlwn deals v..rit.11 
the rationale ior the open JU.Stice system. Difierent reasons which have l)een 
propounded are critically analy:3ed_. and some further reasons are suggested. 
2) Part T,;,qo of the paper briefly discusses tt1e extent of the coverage of the 
Publicity Principle. Tv10 areas oi lavl, t.lie family law area and Juvenile 
oiiending, are examined to analyse why and in what wa~.1s they are 
apparently exempt from the principle. The factors which override the 
Publicity Principle are also analysed . 
.3) Finally the discussion rnoves on tf) deal with the various procedures which 
are used by courts to provide exceptions to the openness concept. The paper 
considers tlw reasoning behind the exceptions .. how they vvork_. and whether 
they are Justified in a justice system \Vhich prides 1tseli on its open access . 
Each excepUon i~; discussed in relation to the Publicity Principle itself and the 
rationale for the principle. 
This paper contends tl1at t11ere are good reasons for t11e principle in our 
system_. and that in general we should be careiul to ·weigh all the competing 
factors involved, t,etore allowing exceptions to become wi,Jespreacl. It Vvill 
also be contended that there are sorne exceptions vv"here the rat10nale that 
underlie t.110 principle do not apply_. one of these being the area of name 
suppression in the criminal la10.1. Appropriate reform is therefore suggested 
in tliis area. 
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PART I - THE PUBLICITY PRINCIPLE 
A) THE PRINCIPLE OF THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
The concept of an open and public justice system, to a large extent speal:s for 
itself. The key is simply the right of access to court proceedings by ttie 
public. "It is clearly statecl in S(>..?ttv S(ott5 . . . applied in Ne,q Zealand in Cv 
C6. . that . apart from statutory provisions t1) the contrary or m some very 
spec:ial circumstances, all regular Courts of Justice must conduct their 
proceedings in public." 7 This common law principle is reinforced by f;tatute 
in t11e criminal area l)y section 136( 1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1965 ~Nl1icl1 
states that sut>ject t(> specific exceptions, all proceedmgs concerning offences 
should be open t(> tlie public. 
The Privy Council case of .l-lcPJ:1-&1'~-..,..)11 v }Jc.P.lJ.&1'Sl?.l:l s consicjers the question 
of V•lhat is an open hearing. In that case the tv,lo parties had tieen marned, 
t>ut in 1931 the husl)and began divorce proceedings against the wife. He 
accused her of misconduct v.,1ith a named party and she made no defence 
against this allegation. Tlle case was hear(l in the Ju,jges· law lit>rary of the 
court house and a divorce Vv"'a.s grant.e(j_ 
When the divorce became absolute, and the parties v.,1ere entitled to marry 
again .. the l1usban(l marrie(j the former Vlife of the person with 1vvl1orn Mrs 
Iv1cPherson had allegemy l)een having an affair. Mrs Iv1cPherson then appl!e(l 
to the court for the divorce t:.r be declared void on the grounds that Iv1r 
McPherson hacl committed perjury at the divorce hearing and that the 
clivorce hearing had not l)een in open court. 
'5 -~.--.--,t• V <::-~.-, .. [lQl,:,] 1..f: 41" • .... -t•V • •! ..... ,_.,t. { -! ~ ) .,n._- I. 
6 .,-. ~r .,-. r1r:i1c: -., ·:,..,_ N7LR c.?c. 
- • - •. J _) .• .J--X - u-u . 
7 Addendum to the 1980 Initial Repot·t of Ne-=:i' Zealand on the Intet·ne.tionl 
Convention of Civil and Political Rights [1982] Human Rights Committee 15th 
Session CCPR iC/ 10 i Add 6, 51. 
ci JkPl1erson v J,f,:-1-"..'1.erson [ 1936 I AC 177 . 
] 
] 
] 
The main question t,-.) be dec:icled in the case was whether the hearing had 
taken place in open court .. considering that it -was held in the judges· lav,, 
lit)rary. 
The judge, Lord Blanesburgh, considered that public: access v,,as tt1e 
fundamental factor to the openness of the proceedings. Vvtiile access v.las 
easy in respect of the court rooms, it ~Nas hindered with respect to tt1e 
library, as this v..,a.s approached through double doors one of ~Nluch had on it 
a sign saying "private". The court considered that this sign would be as much 
a bar to an ordinary member of the public .. as would a door being locked.9 
The judge made it clear that in deciding '0lh€-ther a case had been heard in 
open court, it was irrelevant that tllere were not any members of tlle public 
present, providing that the public could have had access to the hearing even 
in cases Vv'here it was very unlil::.ely that anyone would have attended. He 
stated that "[t.Jhe actual presence of the public is never necessary"! o, t;ut 
that11 
the (:out't must be open to ar1 y -w·ho ma.y pt'esen t themselves fot' 
admission. The t·emoteness of the possibility of any public attendance 
must never by judk:ial action be redu(:ed to the certainty that thet'e 'v:•'ill 
tenone. 
The fact that the judge on beginning tlw proc:eeclings stated tl1at tlie hearing 
was in open court, did not mitigate against this rest.net.ion on publlc access. It 
~Nas also held not to be significant that there would have been no greater 
degree of publicity if the proceedings had been held in a court room, due to 
tt1ere l)Edng no VvTitten list of court l)usiness.12 
Thi~; case clearly illustrates that at common law the general principle is that 
court proceedings should be open to members of the public. It 1s also clear 
that tl1is principle is accepted and entrenc:he(l in Nevl Zealand la~A', not only 
9 Above n 8, 200. 
10 Abov--e n 8,200. 
11 Above n 8 .. 200. 
12 Above n8, 197. 
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by common lav,,1 and statute, but also by tl1e ratification of tt1e International 
Conventic,n on Civil and Political Rights. 
There are still some questions Vv'hic:t1 must be exammed before the Pubhcity 
Principle can t)e fully understood: who is meant by tl1e public; to V•lhat does 
the principle apply, and whether the right to a public hearing belongs solely 
to t11e inclivitjuals involvecl or 'vVlietlier the public has an independent riglit 
of access? 
1) IYbo is 'I.be Pll.blic "? 
The first questions that must be addressed are who is meant by the publtc: 
and why are the media included in this term? "iNhile the parties involved in 
a dispute are a subset of the public .. and as are the judges and other court 
officials ·who make up the state in tlw context of trie justice system.: "t.lie 
public is somehovv• also a third party, apart from both the indivicluals ancl the 
st3te, an,J playing a variety of roles, including those of •.,qitness, audience, 
critic, foil, and commentator."13 There is not one unified body tha.t can be 
c:alle(l 'the puNic·, memt:,ers of t.lie public will all have (lifferent values and 
norms. Hov1ever the term refers t() the public in general, thus mcorporn.tmg 
all these different beliefs and cannot "for instance be limited only to a 
particular category of persons".14 
Article 14 includes the press 111 the term ·public', (in modern terms this may 
be read to encompass also radio and television reporters). Lord Diploct in 
.,I +,>'.)'"r.~·· .-~~r,a,-~ t u- l ' .. ~,,~,- 7. K~-~..,.;r,' 1 c; "Of'· '·d ti,,.at th ,. pf-"" ha••' " r-·1 · .J~ l-l.{ :r .J.Jv.Y -.1._r..,_ . .J'J~-1 L·7.J' v e~V.J.J'V.J .J?":J'L·~&'Li4.J.J'J'f-:' .- o.b t.'t.' JlG .· t:' ... t.'.:,-=, C. V t.' Cl. 1J ~ 
in t11e concept of a puNic justice systern. He ek1)lained t11is role. by 
suggesting that tl1e press are a useful tool in the open admi111strat10n of 
justice as tt1ey disseminate reports of the proceedings to the wider 
community. This means that a much greater percentage of the public V-lill 
learn al)out t11e court liea.ring. 
13 JResnik "Due Pro<:ess: A Publi(: Dimension" (1987) 39 UniY of Fla LR 405, 
407. 
14 Above nL 144. 
15 A ttorne,v- Ge-r:t!:t'B.i v level.let· i.fagB.I'h-ie [ 1979 ] AC 440 .. 450. 
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Certainly Lord Denning who described tl1e media as tl1e "v,ratc:hdog of 
justice"t6 takes a generous viev-l of their work:1? 
A new·spaper reporter says nothing but vlrites a lot. He notes all that goes 
on and ma.lees a fair and accura.te report of it. If he is to do his wurk 
properly and effectively w'e must hold fast to the principle that every 
case must be heard and detet·mined in open court . It must not ta.ke place 
behind locked doo1·s. Every member of the public: must be entitled to 
report in the public press all that he has seen and heard. 
In t11is V?ay tlw media can t>e seen to play a positive role in the puNicity 
concept. Sometimes . however there are negative aspects 111 ttns role, i;;,Jhen 
reports of proceedings may be sensationalized or vvhen pre-trial publicity 
may jeopardize the fair trial of the accused. 
It is tlle positive role which is protected in Nevv Zealand lai;N as the media, 111 
some circ:umstanc:es, have greater rights of access to court hearings than the 
public. Reporters are seen as the public 's representative, and bring a 
mininrn.m element of openness to tlw proc:eec.iings_. vvhile other factors can be 
safeguar(lecl by excluding the general public and restricting publication of 
details of the hearing. In some instances then a particular group of the 
public, the media, is singled out to have access to hearings -Nhile tile general 
public: is exc:lu(led.18 
2) T.he Applicafjoo t?f t..be P.riociple 
The right to a public trial applies to t:ioth criminal and civil cases, an(l to 
higher revievv authorities 19 It applies generally to bot11 t11e evidence ancl the 
judgment of the court. 
16 :Rt Hon Lord Denning "A free Pt·ess" 17 Bt·acton LJ 13,13. 
17 Above n16, 13. 
18 See Pa1·t II a11d Pa1·t III(A) . 
19 Above n 1.. 146. 
Lord Diploct stated in A tt1,.VJ}e}7 -(; .... ::weI?fi v L~v~J./~.r 20 tl1at in criminal trials 
at least, all the evidence should be communicated to the court publicly. Lord 
Diplock·s focus on the evidence in criminal trials is l)ecause in this area the 
state has so much control over the indivicJual and the depnvat10n of personal 
liberty is at st1te. If the public knows the grounds on v.,hich a charge is 
based, this provides a check on the state ·s pov,1er and protects the 
incliviclual ·s freedom . Tlie question can then be asked as to whet11er tt1ere 
are in fact tv,10 different principles of Put)lic Justice, one for cnmmal trials 
and one for civil trials? 
i· .. rticle 14 does not clra,;N tt1is clistinction l)etween criminal awj civil matters. 
it s1mpl)t states the general rule that proceedings should take place m public, 
and it is tl1is approach which is reflected in New Zealand. 
'i,iVhile Article 14 does not specifically deal v,.rith evidence, it does state t11at 
juclgments rerKlerecl in civil or criminal hearmgs shall gE>nerally be made 
public. The fact that .. ~.rticle 14 deals v,.1ith the ju.dgments of cases separately, 
and that it allo,;,,·,1s for fewer exceptions to this rule than to the general rule 
concerning proceedings, sho,;,,% tlrnt put>lic judgments are th,?, fundarnental 
f ea tu.re of the puNic justice concept. It seems that in almost all 
circumstances, a public judgment is tt1e minimum requirement of the 
Publicity Principle. 
T11is minimum requirement is not as clear as is at first apparent. The 
V>lording of the Article raises an interpretation issue as to v,,1hetlier judgment 
means the ju.dge·s reasoning and the result, or just the decision or verdict. 
Obviously if tlie strict or latter interpretation is a(jopted tl1is 'i-\7ill limit t11e 
minimum requirements of pu.l)lic justice t1) a mu.eh greater extent. 
The Criminal Justice Act 1985 clarifies the point in criminal law. Section 
1.36(6) of tlie Act states that 
the announcement of the v-erdict or decision of the court ... an,j the 
passing of senten-:::e shell in every rnse te.ke place in publk; but, if the 
court is satisfied that exceptional cfrcumstances so require, it may 
20 Above n 15 , 450 . 
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<ledine to state in public all or any of the facts, reruons, or other 
considerations that it has tal~en in to a.(:count in rea.ching its dedsion or 
ver<lict or in <letermining the sentence prused by it on any defendant. 
In the criminal context then, the minimum requirement oi the Publicity 
Principle is that only the verdict and the sentence needs to be made public. 
This limits t11e effectiveness of t.lle provision as it is difficult to assess a 
verdict or sentence when the evidence and the reasons on Vv1lich 1t 1s t,ased 
ar~ .::-ur-,p1·r-,:-,::-r -1 t:::' ·-· -· t:::'-_o~·~( . 
The position is not dear in the civil context, T ... vt1ere it is governecl by t11e 
inherent jurisdiction oi the court rather t11an by statute. The term is used 
commonly in both senses as for example in tlle High Court Rules. Rule 540 
governs the time and mocle oi giving tlle judgment, and uses the term in its 
wicler sense. Rule 539 defines "judgment .. for Rules :A 1-544 and uses the 
stricter dMinit10n, defining also the term "reasons for judgment" . 
The same point v,.,as raised in L:1Jh:? v L1Jte 21_, ,Nhich T1,11as an appeal irom a 
fincling made during a (livorce case Uiat the ,,\rife had committed adultery. 
Under sect.ion 2 7 oi the Judicature .to.et 192 5, (UK) 1t v.r.1.s possible to appeal 
from "tlle whole or any part oi any judgment or order." The court held that 
this reference meant only U-1e "iormal judgment or order which is drav,m up 
and disposes of the proceedings, ancl v.,l1ich, in appropriate cases, t11e 
su.c:c:essiul party is entitled to enforce or exec:ute"22, and not the statement of 
tlie judge's reasons ior tl1at decision . 
Tli,s, courts in Nev{ Zealand llave t'io\TO options in ciefining "judgrnent" Vv1ien 
exercising their inherent jurisdiction in the civil area. One is t{) f ollovl the 
interpretation of 'judgment' in L~~t:& v laJ{·;3- 2 ::; which 1Nould mate the civil 
la1N consistent with the criminal law. Ho,Never in doing so this would 
Cll•r ,~t1· ~--11y r· ,::,,j1u .-.,-, t"" ,::, ,::,ff,::, ··t ·)f tl· 1· C 1· 11· r11· 1-,1u1·. r· .• ··11 1 1· 1· ,::,1· . .:::.1· t ";";T1· tt· .-)] j t .:::.1· tl· ,::,1· d.-:, . '-..-c1. v. t_ • .,, .-.d -.- v ~-<.- . (.. . 1 ~· I J. I1 t?t1 _~ -~ IL 1 .. ~I ~it- __ .. _. L 
U-1e evidence or the reasoning of the judge 1t is not possil)le for the pu.bllc t() 
analyse tlle judge·s result. The effect of this approach would be to sever€-ly 
21 L~.e v L._9J,e[1955]P "3'36. 
22 Above n21.. 344. 
23 Above n21 .. }H 
9 
... 
..  
• 
limit tlie effectiveness of Article 14 as a protection against closed and secret 
hearings_. ( as is the provision in the Criminal Justice Act 1965). 
The alternative vvould be to give the word 'judgment· a generous 
interpretation, so tliat both the decision and tlie reasons for that decision 
vvere public in all but a very limited number of cases. It is this latter 
approach v,,hich v..1ould be consistent 'vVith the purpose of Article 14 . 
]) A Public Kight o.r ilD Individllill Kight ? 
The Publicity Principle expoundecl in i· .. rticle 14 1s framed in terms of the 
individual's right to have a public hearing24 .. rather than the public's right of 
access to hearings. This worcling could almost suggest that if the parties 
want.eel to give up this right the puNic and media v,,1ould have no right of 
3.cc:ess . 
Lord Diplocl::. in the A tt,o.rn.f!-7-(;ener.1.l v levelle.r lvI.1g.::;·z.ine 25 discussed the 
notion of public justice, and appeared to frame 11is concept around the press 
and the public's nght to have free access t.o court hearings. Tlus seems more 
in line V•.rith the general notion of an open court syster.n.26 
In tlie United States l?.ic.lJ11J:()JJd .iv"&i,vs.p.1pe.r5.; i11c v rz~·gfnl~127 dealt witli this 
point. The case concerned a murder trial in ~h·hich the (lefendant had 
requested that tlie trial be closed to tlie public, and as the prosecutor did not 
object_. the judge made an order tc, this effect. Later tvvo reporters brought a 
case arguing that t11e press and the public had t11e right to be present. Chief 
Justice Burger in the Supreme Court stat>-?d that the 1st and 6th Amendments 
24 Article 14 of the international Convention on Civil t1nd Po1itic:a1 Rights, 
states that "eveqrone shall be entitled to a fair and public .hearing .. . " 
25 Above nl5 . 
26 See also the case of .J{c1-~1erson above n8 .. where it ivas also held that the 
public have a t·ight of a.(:cess to a. court of justice. 
27 li!ki1mu-ndllerr,'J:0o.pe1-..s:. lnc v Virgiti.i6: (1980) 448 US 555, 580. 
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to t11e Constitution gave tt1e press and t11e public tt1e right of access to 
trials. 28 
The Nev., Zealand report on tlle Convention appears to accept the pnnc1ple as 
a duty owed b>7 the courts to the public: "all regular Courts of Justice must 
conduct their proceedings .. 29 "in a public court v,,1ith open doors."30 It is 
generally ac:c:epte,j tt1at in tt1is country there is not only tlie indiviclual rigl"1t. 
to a public hearing, but also generally a public rigllt of access to proceedings. 
There is a corresponding duty on the judges t,:) ensure a hearing v,,1as public:, 
unless it iell within one of the ackno,.1,tledged exceptions.31 For example 
section 138( 1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 governs the position in 
criminal proceedings and states that : 
[s ]ubje(~t to the provisions of subse,::tions (2) and (3) of this section arid of 
ariy other enactment, every sitting of any court dealing ~rith ar1y 
pt'oc:eedings in respec:t of an offence shall be open to the public. 
In civil matters the position is similar. The parties do have some choice as to 
wlietlier tliey use the justice system or a private dispute resolution met11od .. 
for example arbitration. Hov.,ever, if the dispute 1s brought to tlle 1u.st1c:e 
system then the common law position is that general1)1 hearings rnust t,e 
open to the public. 
It is not possible under Nev., Zealand lav., for the parties at a proceeding t() 
opt to have a closed hearing. Thus in this country the right t::) an open court 
system lies vv'ith the public rather than the parties to the hearing. In effect 
Nev,, Zealand lav.,r is a step allead of the position envisaged l)y Article 14. Tl1at 
provision aims to clef end people from tot3.litarian regimes, rather than t(, go 
so far as to protect tl"1e pu.Nic's rigllt of access to tl1e courts . 
28 Above n 27, 580. 
29 Abov--e n 7, 51. 
30 Above n 7 .. 51. 
31 See Part III. 
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Summary 
The PuNic:ity Principle means that rn Nev,, Zealand t11ere is a general rule 
that all court proceeclings are open tJ'.) the putiltc:. It is not necessary for any 
members of t11e public t:; be present at a hearing for t11e hearing to be ·open·, 
but there must not be any restriction on public access. In this country the 
Publicity Principle protects the public's right of access as v .. ,ell as the 
individual's right t1.) a public: hearing. 
In most circumstances the general public and the media have the right t,.-) be 
present at court proceedings, to hear t11e evidence, ancl tlie court's decision 
and reasoning. The minimum requirement of the Publicity Principle is that in 
every criminal c:ase the decision or verdict of the court nrnst always be made 
public. It is not clear whether the courts 'If.rill adopt this approach in the civil 
area V./hen exercising t11eir inherent juriscliction.: or ,....,hett1er a more generous 
dMinition of 'judgment' "\Nill be adopted, so that the reasons of the court are 
included in tllis minimum requirement. 
The fact tllat there is a minimum publicity requirement stresses the 
importance of the Publicity Principle. Why then is the publlc administration 
of justice so important in our society today? 
12 
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B) THE RATIONALE FOR THE PUBLICITY PRINCIPLE 
Tl1e paramount concern of t11e Publicity Principle is to ensure tl1at justice is 
done.3 2 This is not lunited to justice l)etv,,een the parties involved, but also 
includes justice in the v,,1ider sense. 
It is fundamental t) a discussion of both the Publicit}r Principle_. and of tlw 
necessary exceptions t() that principle, tlrn.t there is an analysis of the 
reasons why t11is idiom is now accepted as a principle of constitutional 
status. The discussion ,,qill start v,,1ith the historical background to the 
PuNicity Principle atKl a t11eoretical explanation for it. A variety of reasons 
v,,1ill then be examme(l v,1hich justify the pnnciple on the l)as1s of the role the 
public plays in the process of adjudication. Finally the principle will be 
justified on the basis of the function of an open court system for the public. 
1) The Hist.orit:aJ Basis 
The starting point in an analysis of the reasons for the Publicity Principle is 
its historical basis. It v.Jas claimed by E,urger CJ in .Jr.-'.fc.,.~YJ:h)JJd )V&rf'-:.~o.:to..-:?1:.,;_: I11c 
v ~')fgi.n1~1 that throughout the hist()ry of the common lav,, courts, there has 
always been a presmnption that the pu.t)lic can attend trials, and t11erefore 
the public must be allov.Jed to continue to att.end-33 
It ha'.; been suggested that this practice start.ed as "almost a necessary 
incident of jury trials, since the presence of a jury - involving a panel oi 
thirty-six men and more - already insured the presence of a large part of the 
public."34 Anotl1er suggestion is tl1at accon.iing to ancient notions a court 
hearing is necessarily a public occasion.35 
32 Above n 5,437. 
33 Above n 27, 5 73 per Chief Justk:e Burger 
34 NA Radin "The Right to a Public Trial .. [19"32] Temple LQ 381, }88. 
35 G Netthiem "The Principle of Open Justice" T~m UL Rev (1984) 8 no 1, 25 .. 
26. 
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In the early nineteenth century Jeremy Bentham extolled the virtue~: of a 
public justice system:36 
~lithout publicity_. all other checks 8i'e fruitless: in compru·ison of 
publicity_. all other checks are of small account. It 1s too publicity, more 
than to 8nything else put together, that the English s:tstem of proc:edrn·e 
o~res it being the least bad system as yet extant, instead of being the 
'::'Ot'St. 
Juclith Resnik, in her article "Due Process: A Public Dimension", suggests that 
there are several proNems in t11e notion that historical background is a 
reason for the Publicity Principle.37 She claims that v./t1ile it is cllfficult. to 
establish Vlhat past practice ..,,.,as in this regard, it is clear that it -r.,qas varied 
ant1 that it is too enthusiastic to suggest that there T01as an "unbroten" lin,s, of ,_,,_,. 
case la,,v in this respect. However tl1is criticism may l)e too harsh as it is 
based on Resnik's cl::um that "the Chief Just.ice asserted t.h:3.t he had found an 
"unbroten line of open access to trials ... ":3 8; in fad his claim concerned only 
a "presumption of open access"_:39 
Resnit.·s other criticism is fairer: she asserts that "[shmplv because we have. . ' . 
in the past, eitl1er included or excluded the public does not confirm tl1at we 
should do the same thing tocta,,_ .. 40 Certainlv soc:ietv cannot continue ._, I I ' 
traditions just t,ecause they are traditions, without paying any regard t() the 
ments and disadvantages of the practice .. and to the other factors vvl11ch can 
rationalize t11e principle. 
FToce(lure (loes change over time41 , and historical prececient does not 
necessarily lend merit to a practice. For example, historically proceedings 
36JBenth8.m as quoted in "J.'Ot':..kso-fjet-&m,v.Betitile.a.iVol 4 Ed Bo~rring_. 317. 
'37 Above n 1"3, 409- 412. 
'38 Above n 13.. 411. 
39 Above n27, 57"3 
40 Above n11 411 
41 for example Resnik points out the developing procedure with jurors who 
used to be chosen for theit· dirnct kno':':tledge of disputed events.Above n13, 
411. 
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concerning family matters '·"1ere held in open, public courts, even though 
they concerned such specifically private matters. In the case of .hJ,::F}~'2-.rS()JJ"V 
.lvk:Pl1t?.rst'11 42 in 19.36, Lord Blanesburgh held tl1at in these types of cases 
esp,eciallv. p,u.blic: access had tr> be T)rotect~d. because these vvere the verv I • I.. . I 
types of cases where the parties v,,ould try to avoid publicity. The perception 
of the morality of these separations has changed so much that in Ne,N 
Zealand today tl1e putilic l1as very limited access to the Family Courts. The 
protection of the inclividual's privacy in these hearings 1s novv recognized as 
tlie paramount concern. Thus what was traditionally an area of public access 
has changed completely, as public attitudes have developed. 
While it is obvious then that vve cannot place undue emphasis on the 
historical aspect of the Publicity Principle, neither can we ijisregard the role 
c,f historv. "Whether ·unbroken· or sp1oradic. whether right or v,,7rone there is I • I •..J 
some tradition of a role for the public in adjudication."43 Publicity gives the 
proceedings formality and it "is the authentic hall-mark of judicial as d1stmct 
from administrative procedure ..... 44 
In Nev,.r Zealand tl1i?.re is a tradition tllat courts are essentially open to the 
public, and in both the criminal and civil areas, closed courts are believed to 
be very rnucll the exception tf.) tlle principle. Tlle weight of past practice 
woulcl bear heavily on any attempt to deviate from the presumption of open 
(·r' 1u1·t r· 1· (', ~-;::.,::, d1" 1·1rr·-· ... . ) -· _r.·' ... '·-· ._ . ._. '" & ,: •. 
2) Tbe Poblics Josf..ir..":e System - Tbeo.ret..ir..-:al l.!nde.rpinnings. 
The public should llave access t) the justice system as in effect tl1e justice 
system is the public's system. The justice S}tSt~m works for the public:, 
governs tlle puUic, and is made up of rnembers of the public. " ... [T]lle public 
is the state. Our employees - judges, jurors, magistrates, administrative lav,,7 
jucjges or the like - l1ave tlie po,qer V) speak for the public and .. in theory, 
according t) norms generated by the public "45 
42 Above n8, 201. 
43 Above n1"3, 412. 
44 Above n8, 200. 
4:, Above n13, 407. 
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The Social Contract theorists, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, both suggest 
that societies developecl V.,Then humanity stopped living in a state of nature, 
and gave up the mdiv1dual rights that went w1tl1 this, tllus empowenng the 
state to make and administer laws. Locke argued tJ1at in the state of nature46 
all men may be restrained from invading other's t·ights, and from doing 
hrn·t to one anothet·, and the la':/ of nature be observed, vthich iotilleth 
the peace and preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of 
nature is, in that state .. put into every man ·s hands, vrhereby everyone 
has the right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a. degree .. as 
may hindet· its violation . For the la':r of nature wouM .. as all other lavts 
that concern men in this world, te in vain, if there zvere nobody that in 
the state of nature had a power to execute the.t la"'w· . ... And if anyone in 
the state of nature may punish another fot· any evil he has done, every 
one may do so: fot· in that state of perfect equality vthere naturally thet·e 
is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another . what ariy man may 
do in prosecution of that la:'Yr .. every one must needs have a t·ight to do . 
He continues to explain what happens to law as pol1t.1cal or civil so(:1ety is set 
up:4? 
because no political society can be, nor subsist .. "l"rithout having in itself 
the power to f·t·eserve the property .. and in order thereunto punish the 
offences of all those of that society: there, and there only .. is political 
society_. 1;rhere everyone of the members hath quitted this natural po-w·er 
t·esigned it up into the hands of the community. . . And thus all private 
judgement of every partic:ul.ai· member being excluded, the community 
comes to be umpire .. by settled standing rules . ... 
46 J Lod~e S5·(tmd TreatL1--e of" Civl! l;;·veni"£oe11t as quoted in X.'es:diJig'S 111 
5'o,:i8l ond Politkol Ei1Jl(Js·opil,T·~ ed RM Ste-r,rart ( Oxford University Press 
ltKOt'p 1986 ) .. 19. 
47 Above n46, 5 
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Theoretically then it can be argued that each member of the community has 
an inherent right of access to the justice system, as the state holcls this 
pov,.rer only as the represent:l.tive of the community. 
Democratic societies acknowledge tl1e putilic's interest in the state, by public 
elections of the legislature. While in New Zealand judges are seen as being 
al)ove elections, the put>lic still has an interest in t11e justice system, as the 
admmistrator of society's laTvvs. This gives the public in any democratic: 
society a right to have access to the justice system. The public has a right to 
some input into the process, and some control over it; v.,hich can be 
maintained only if there is a put>lic right of access to the courts. If the public 
does not l:now ,;Nhat is happening in the courts then 1t has no control ovt?r 
the courts and in effect no control over tl1e powers of the state. 
Related to t11is is t11e notion in the criminal justice system t11at a crime is an 
offence agamst tJ1e community. This means that the public: has an interest in 
seeing wrongdoers brought to justice, which arguably it should be possible to 
manifest. bv 2"aininf: access to the courts. • ' .,j r....J. 
3) Pul>lit~ity as a.o Aid [.,t, Jusfjce-
There is a role for the public: in the justice system, v.,hich can_. theoretically at 
least, l)enefit the system. The suggestion is that puNic access provides a 
checl::. on the judges, enhances fad. finding and acts in the criminal context as 
as t,oth a punishment to the oifender, and a general det$rrent to society. 
a) Accou.of.3bility-
It has often been suggest$d in bot11 texts and c:ase-law, that public, open 
trials are one oi the numerous checks and balances of the svstem48. The , 
focus is on the monitoring of the judge·s pc}\-Ver:49 
If the v.ray that courts behave (:8nnot t:.e hidden from the 1>ublic ear e1nd 
eye this provi.Jes a safeguard against judicial a.rbitra1·iness 01· 
48 for example see above n27, S92 a11d a.t:,ove n36, 305. 
49 Above nlS, 450 . 
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idiosyncra:;y and maintains the public confidence in the administration 
of justice . 
If justice tal:es place openly and in public .. this gives the justice system some 
public ac:c:ountability.50 
The judges speak and act on behalf of the community. They necessarily 
exer·8ise great po1vrers in order to dis(Jl8.rge hea:,r;r responsibilities . The 
fact that they do it under the eyes of their fellow citizens means that 
they must provide daily and puNic assurar1ce that so fa1· as they <~an 
manage 1t ~that they do is done efficiently . [and justly]. 
It is claimed that v..1idespread media coverage can reduce the possibility of 
arbitrariness, and encourages public debate so that the public can to some 
extent judge the judges. Tlw reasons t:oellincl ju,jges· tiecisions must "justify 
themselves at the l)ar of public opinion."51 
Ho,N then does this accountability ,qort? In this country judges have 
security of tenure, ancl High Court judges can only be rernoved l)y the 
Sovereign or the Governor -General, acting upon an address of the House of 
Representatives, and only on the grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity to 
discharge their functions5 2. Thus there would have to be a very serious 
mis(jemeanour l)efore a judge wouw be removed. 
Partly perhaps the accountability claim is psychological, that judges ,hlill act 
in a fairer manner ,Nhen they tnov.,;r that they act in the public's view Also 
the meclia can be seen as playing a large and constructive role in t11is 
rationale. Through the media, criticism of JU\iges· deos10ns will have a mucl1 
2-reater imp .. act. ~Nhile the decision is unlitelv to be overturned unless there ._. ' 
is an appeal, the judges may bear the criticism in mind in later decisions 
especially if tlw matter concerns puNic policy. ProbaNy the scenario t11at 
would illustrate the great~st control by the put)lK_. would be public: di?.l)ate m 
50 Bro.adco.Stiag 1..,~71:_t:.or.ation v A ttonw,v-Fel'J.·.t;ral [ 1982 ] 1 NZLR 120, 123. 
51 Above n16, 13. 
52 Section 23 The Constitution Act 1986. 
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the media abc>ut a judge's misdemeanour, eventually leading to the judge·s 
resignation. 
The legislature has recently recognized this role of the media as "the 
vvatc:hdog of justice"5:3 as section 1.38 of the Criminal Justice iilict 1985 alloT0.TS 
courts to limit putAication of the det .. ails of hearings in some situations, and to 
exclude mernt)ers of the public, but the courts has very limited po,Ners to 
totally rernove reporters.54 ~.~lhile 111 practice the media would onl;l rarel;l 
stay in a proceeding of vvhich they can report only lirnited details, this 
provision theoretically acts as a further control on the courts.55 
To the extent that this accountability does worl~, it vilOu.ld be useful in lxitl1 
the criminal and the civil context; although t(> some extent this depends on 
the quality of reporting by the media. 
b)Accuracy 
Another reason for the Publicity Principle focuses on the parties within the 
systern in tlotl1 criminal and civil cases, ancl suggests that puNic proceedings 
enhance fact-finding in tv,10 v.fa.ys.56 First, there is a claim that vvitnesses 
unl-:.nov,m to the parties may come forvvard as a result of the public 
proceedings. While the emergence of nevv evidence may arise from the 
pu.tilicity when a crime is committed, it v..rou.ld be very rare for nev,1 evidence 
to arise as a result of the hearing itself. 
Secondly, it is claimed that people who testify in court would be more 
litely to tell the truth in a public hearing, than if the proceeding v .. ,as held in 
:,J Above n16, 13. 
Y! Se(:tion 138 of the Criminal Justice A<:t 19t:5, replaces the inhet·ent 
jurisdiction previously exercised by the criminal courts, and allo-vls reporters 
to be excluded from hea1·ings only in the interests of security and defence. 
~>5 PresumaDly the reasoning is that if something untoi:rru·d wet·e to happen 
in the heru·ing_. the reporters couM object (on behalf of the puMi<::), or they 
could risk being held in contempt of court for breach of 8. court order and 
report the judge ·s misdemea11ou1·. 
56 Above n27_. 596 - 97. 
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private. Resnik points out tllat other processes are based on tJ1e opposite 
assumption, namely that people are more likely to be truthful Vlhen they 
tnov.., that v,.r11at they say is confidential and will not be subject to puNic 
scrutiny, her example 1s that of tJ1e process of giving acadenuc tenure.5 7 This 
ey,ample may not be that analogous as it is a situation where opinion rather 
than factual evidence is given, ,.,.11thin the closed community of a faculty, 
vvhere lack of confidentiality may cause some detriment to the party giving 
the evidence. 
In court hearines it would onlv be in ver,1 rare cases that a v...itness Vlould ..., , I 
l)e inspired t:) N~ honest by the kno·vvledge that there ,i..rere rnemt)ers of the 
public:, or press present. Generally people \'1110 would lle, Vvill lie Vlhether the 
hearing is open to the public: or not. 
t':) Peter.rent and Pllnisb.ment 
In the criminal area publicity can act as both a deterrent and a 
punishment58 Through reading reports of criminal proceedings, the public 
1 ... '°"1"!}C -:.1) -~ 11 t t1·1 ~- ,-.,::,...-,lt.::::.1·1;· ··· c 1· 1·r1p ·")Cu,·1 ()f} (11· f f,::,.r,::,.t}t ,·)f f;··1·1dP-t·,~ 8 lC·(; tJ·1u1·u 1'- ':f t:,:',:1,. ._. ,_.__,I.,)-· t;::- .;:,._.,1J . ._. vt;::'._, 1._ . ._..._."" • "" ._. ._. _. -.. 'v' •J> .:, • .a. J. ._i._. V V V' ,_._ 
aenern.1 impression emanated that criminals are cauJY...,ht and brought tJ.) 0 ,_ tJ 
justice, as the media usually report t11e initial offence and then details of any 
proceedings brought. It is only in major cases that the put,lic is likely to 
reniember when tJie perpetrator of an offence has not t)een arrested. 
Publicity is re~arded bv some of fenclers as a harsh nunishment as it can ·-· ' r-· 
damage a reputation in an area .. especially if the offence relates in somi?. wa.y 
to the off ender·s Vv'ork. 
Sometimes t11e Legislature mates use of tl1is aspect of publicity. For example, 
section 61 of the Transport Act 1962 .. states that the court has very limited 
powers t1.) give name suppression orcjers .. or t() order that the hearing be 
(losed t0 the public .. in respect to drint driving charges. The dangers of drink 
(!riving have been widely acJ~nov,.rledged in recent years and tl1ere have been 
Vvidespread attempts to eradicate such offences. This provision suggests that 
57 At,ove n13, 416. 
53 SH ~!ood "Publicity of Children's CoU1·t Proceedings" [1964] NZLJ 347, 350. 
., 
the offence is so grave that only in very limited circumstances should 
anyone be able to claim immunity from the publication of their 
misbehaviour. It is also prot)able t11at as the stigina for drink ,jriving 
offences increases, tliis provision v?ill act as a det.Brrent, if the names of such 
offenders are published regularly. 
2 1 
4) Int.eracfjt,n f.v Assist in the .E.xpressft?D and .{ienerafjon t?f 
Nor.ms. 
Resnik suggests another rationale, ·which focuses on the role the public plays 
in t11e system. The suggestion is that the public's interaction in the system 
helps tl.) generat.B and develop society's norms. She argues that it 1s vvrong t() 
assume "that when judges work vvit.llin reach of the public .. we the public can 
check t() be sure that judges are acting in accordance with the established 
norms".59 
Norms are not concrete.. "prefixed, [nor] independent of the disputes that 
they govern."60 Instead Resnik suggests that norms are being generated 
during tlie (lispute resolution proce(lure due to the interaction betV•leen the 
disputants, the adjudicati:)r and the public:. This process is seen as essential 
b)1 Resnik because society is not one "single. homogeneous community. 
Rather V·le are a series of publics, ¥lith values at great variance, and we live a 
fragile coexistence... 61 
Ol)viously norms cannot be generated as particular court proc:eeclings are 
heard, as the public is silent and doec:; not interact with the adjudicat()r. The 
judge·s norms may develop during tl1e proceedings_. t>ut they cannot t)e 
influenced at tlus st~.ge by the publK. During a proceeding the media also 
cannot help in the generation of norms as tl1is would be prejudicial to the 
hearing and probably in contempt of court. 
In the long term though, norms do develop as the media and public: crit1oze 
and comment on the result of proceedings. This response will effect some 
59 Above n13, 417. 
60 Above nn 417 
61Atove nl} 417. 
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judges in later cases_: for example if there is a widespread feeling that 
sentences for violent off enders are too lenient_. this may t>e reflected in later 
sentencing patterns. 
There are problems even 'Nith this long-terrn generation of norms. i·~s Resnik 
recognizes v?e are not one identifiable public, vvith a st1ared and defined set 
of norms, and values, thus tlwre V-lill l)e a variety of responses from cliff erent 
sectors of the community. The most that judges can hope to do is to reflect 
the views of a substantial majority of the population. 
Anottier problem is that it may tle incorrect to assume that tl1e range of 
media views is synonymous vn.th the range of puNic viev,,s on tlw matter In 
some instances t11is rnay be an advantage as the media's opinions rnay be 
more developed than society's, ·which can encourage norms to evolve more 
quickly. 
It seems though that there is a role for the public: and t11e media in the long-
term generation of norms. Also this reasoning supported by judge's use of 
"putlliC policy" reasons in their decision-making. PuNic policy arguments 
lead V.> the fonnulation of principles Vv1"iicl1 are rneant to be for the common 
good and which encourage socially acceptable behaviour. It 'Nould therefore 
be ironic if these public policy principles were formulated behind closed 
,Joors in non-puNic proceedings. 
The public: accepts that the courts are free to make public policy principles, 
and to develop and interpret some of the norms by which our society is 
governed. Tl1is in itself gives the courts a considerable amount of pov?er, if 
this process -r.Nere to tal::.e place behind closei::i doors ,;,qith no public debate or 
criticism on the results reached bv these norms or of the norms themselves. ' . this v,,10ulcl be a draconian increase in the court's pov .. 1er.62 
No --Vlt'ong is done by any member of the public vtho exercises the 
ordinary rigM of <;riticizing, in good faith, in public or private, the 
public a.et done in a seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public v;,ro_y: 
62 A.mt'8I'iiV Atton1.e-.v-C.e-lW!'B..l lut' Triri:ld&:i 6:tld l't-1t,ago [1936] AC 322,33:1 per 
Lord Atkin . 
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the wTong-hea.ded are permitted to err therein: ... _Justice is not a 
(:loistered virtue: she must be allowed to suffet· the scrutiny and 
respectful, even though outspoken, comments of ordinary men. 
A lrc.-:.,·l~T t1r.,:.:,. .---,,11rt'c- r·,1ubl1· C- pnt1· h~T r>t·1· ""11'·1·r·lp.c- aru 1ht·1·t1· C-1.'?f:.(l t)ur··,11 ·1se tll~ r·o' 1 ·11·tc-.£ .1. ..... ~·-'-- 1 L-11 ... # ...... _. - - ._. r-· . _. _ 'I,,; 1._. 1 .r- i• .... r-' ._.._. ~ .., _. _. -·-· _ v·J-.L... ... ...... L .__. 
have a very limited perspective of society. For example, the judg,s,s in Nev,, 
Zealancl are pre(lominantly v..rllite .. middle-c:lass, males. If tlie courts ~Nere t) 
remove themselves further from society by v,,orking behind closed doors, the 
justice system v,,1ould lose all credibility in the public's eyes. Even if the 
courts func:tionecl just as v,,ell behind closed doors_. justice vvould not bE:- seen 
to t,e done. 
5) Justi1.-=-e- must be Seen ttJ be DtJDe 
"Justice must be seen to be done" is a common idiom in common law justice 
systems_. ancl is often advanced as the pnncipal reason for the Publicity 
Principle. It is a reason wt1ich focuses on tl1e role of an open justice s7stem 
for the public. Thus it is seen as central t(:, a democratic system that justice is 
administere(l openly ancl in pul)lic:. In tllat v,,ay tlie puNic can be reassured 
that the pov,,ers of the state are being applied in accorclanc:e ~Nith the lav,,s 
macle by Parliarnent, the elected representative of the public. Public court 
systems are one of the first things that 1s dispensed Tvllith when totalitarian 
states are set up. 
i·.n open justice system stops tlie public from buiWing up imaginary and 
uncompliment1ry pictures of the courts.63 Due to the accountabillty that 
puNicity t)rings, people l1ave rnore trust in tlie system ancl liolcl it in liiglier 
regard. "It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental 
imnortance that Justice should not onlv be done but shoulcl manifest.Iv and r- . ' ' 
undoubtedlv be seen to be done."64 , 
63 Jf Bu1·t'1"'V./-~ ~r,=--n;•\' l(.c.-11·0 { ,::--n;• it.~· ?.= 7,=--n;• '?,=,;::,l,::-~1- -~ {'"JP.·j Tl·1e l·Te..,-1'"P·RPP.1'" • '_I 1J ...- l':f._. II"._ .&l!.:V~ U .._.,.._.,; II" ... .&. .&':f-...r II" _._.~.._-;... ... l/ \"'-"\ ~ :'t • 1 ~· -• ._, ~· 
Publishers· Association of NZ(INC) 1980), 181. 
64 .l?v 5).,1.s:fex._/1 ..1.stk"/3-s e..r. p. J!,:,··{',g_rtJ-.i,v [1924] 1 KB 256, 2:)9 per LorJ He1;ra1·t_. 
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If it ..,1-,ere believed by much of society tl1at justice was not done in th.::. 
courts .. then the justice system would not operate efficiently. People would 
not report crimes, laws would not be followed, and people would take tlie 
law inki their ovv111 hands, f mding other -..Nays to solve their disputes. 
Related to this rationale is the notion that in this sense public proceedings 
can be seen as eclucative, by giving the public "an opportunity l)ot.11 for 
understanding the system in qeneral and its VvTorkinP"
0
s m a f-iarticu.lar case ... ,_, u . 
which it is clairned will result in confidence in the system and in tlw 
administration of justice.65 
Again this reasoning can be criticized as it rests on a number of assumptions. 
It is questionable whetl1er many people would understand U-1e procedure or 
v.,hat happened in the court-room. The rationale assumes also that v,1hat 
members of t11e public: see in the court v.,ill encourage them to have positive 
feelings about the system; in fact it is quite possil)le that the opposite could 
happen. 
Perhaps more importantly it is not lil::.ely that people are educated al)out 
court proceedings t(> the samt? dt?gret? v1hen tl1t?y do not attend the hearing 
but learn of it through the media. i·is it is only the minority of the populaticm 
vvho actually go and sit in on court proceedings_. this educative role of the 
PuNicity Principle is relatively minor. 
The Publicity Principle also plays anotJwr role as educator in tlle criminal 
context. Through open court proceedings and the media reports of those 
procet?clings .. the public learns of the crimes tl1at are committed anci l)econ1es 
avvare of hovl ti:) attempt tJ.') avoid those crimes. This is especially useful 
Vlhere there is some pattern or trend to the offences. 
6) The 1..":t,n.rt..s As Law-makers 
It is now rec(>gnizec! that the courts must sometimes determine law as V>lell 
as ascertain it. Theoreticallv the former is seen as the role of U-1e legislature ' u 
and not as a function of the courts. Thus in the past it has been claimed that 
65 Above n27, 572. 
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the law eyjsted ancl the courts just dec:lared 'Nllat it was. but clid not actually 
·make· law. Practically it is obvious both that the courts clo make lavl_. and 
tl1at it is necessary for this to be part of tl1eir function. Coote P recently 
justified the court's law mating function as "in a sense fill[ing] gaps in an 
i·.ct. "66 
It can be argued that if the courts mate lav.,r the pul:>lic: must have the right 
of access t(, the courts.: or at the least the right t,:) a pul)lK judgrnent v.,rhic:11 
includes the reasons for the clec:ision .. so that the pul)lic can knov,, v.,hat the 
la,,..., is on any particular issue. Practically, access to the courts may not be of 
much use in clarifying the lavv for a large majority of tl1e population. 
Hov-lever, tlfr; c:loes not rebut this reason for public: access as the same 
argu.rnent could l:>e made against the practice of the puNication of statutes; 
for a large majority of the population most of Ne,q Zealand's Legislation 
v,,1ouh:l l:>e incomprehen~:il:>le. Ignorance of the law is no excuse in our society, 
so there must be, at least theoretically_. sorne v.ra.y for the public to know 
~.,.,1hat the courts are cletermininq the la.w to be. ·-· 
7) Ct"Jmmlloity Cat./Ja.rsis 
A final argument which has been used as another justification for the 
Publicity Principle, pertains essentially to crilninal cases, and suggests U1at 
public trial'.:: have a therapeutic v::1.lue for the members of the community, by 
allowing them ti:) express their outrage and protest at shocking crimes.67 Tl1e 
argument is that the court system allovv .. s the public an outlet for these 
feelings as tlle public can .. vvatcl1 justice l)eing done ancl see retribution. 68 
\i\7itl1out public trials, it is claimed t.llat vigilante groups v,,ou.1,1 t)e 
est3.blished. 69 
66 li.,,t•th·!Ftn ·1 ,l.filf., ~7-=·t, -1.~t·,~ ~r l 7,;-tl;,:;t•n l/ifl·- l ~-1 [1QOQ] 1 l•l7LR c;: ·:A C")·::·o" ... ~u .. ,..., .... -... .. t. ..,'}~.., ... ..,1,. l'.;......,..,ULJ ... .,J , ,,,.",f~._J..,,.,w.., •• .fr..,.,,....,l .-,(..; -,UU - J_U~ __ , . 
67 It c:ould be a1·g:ued that some (:ivil c:ases may ha.Tv"'B the same effect, for 
example in some tort actions. 
68 Above n27, 572. 
69 Above n27, 572. 
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Resnii~ analysed this argument and pin-pointed several problems. First she 
questionE:-d the number of pE:-ople v1rho ,Nould actually need to vent their 
emotions V{hen tlwy heard of a crime_7o Generally .. only people who are 
affected by the crime in a direct way would t,e litely to feel this emot.10nal. 
However .. in cases TNhich particularly offend the public's sense of decency .. for 
example t11e more serious sex offences .. especially v,.rhere children or elderly 
people are involved, members of tlw public may V{ish to express tlieir anger 
in some way. 
Secondly, Resnit states that even if there are people v1ho do ,,qish t.? vent 
their emotion .. the ability tfj attencl trials or read reports of tlw trial are not 
very eff ec:tive W-.?J.ys of doing this as tnals are very subdued and much of the 
procedure is aimed at controlling emotions. ~Nhen emotions are running high 
at a trial, the proceedings are of ten closed, due to the disruptions these 
emotions may cause. Also there is often a substantial delay betv.,reen the 
commission of a. crime and a trial, so the hearing is not an immed1at.R- outlet. 
Finally this sort of reasoning v,.rould probably only apply to crimes v,.rhich 
have l)een l)rought into the public eye l)y the media, as open access to courts 
does not necessarily mean that the puNic v.J11l att.R-rKl, or even learn of the 
trial. In such a small country as New Zealand most reported crimes that are 
not of a very minor nature are reported in the media., so this criticism does 
not apply in the Nev{ Zealand context. 
1Nhile these criticisms do limit the impact of this rationale, the larger trials .. 
which are reported in the media., mate the public feel that there is a 
response to a criminal action .. tliat justice is N~ing done, and tlw perpetrator 
1s punished. This is especially true in situations v,,1lere the publlc may have 
believed that there would be some bias on the part of the system .. for 
example if some public official is involved . 
In this \vay the Publicity Principle may worl~ to st1.)p people getting 
emotional about crimes, as they tnov>l that their involvement is not 
necessary because the justice system ,,vill deal vvith the offender adequately. 
Usually people only feel the need to get involved in instances where justice 
70 Above n13, 412 - 413 
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is not seen t<> have been done.: eitJ1er because an oifender vvas not punished 
for a crime, or where members of the community believe an action should be 
a crime, l)ut wflic:h the justice system does not regard as sucli. 
CtJDClllsiOD 
Tl1e principal aim of an open court system is to ensure that tt1e system is 
'just· and 1s seen as being 'just·. Other tl1an this, it is difficult to categorically 
state that there is one identifiable rationale which underlies tJ1e Publicity 
Principle. 
Historically tJ1e open admimstration of justice is recogmsed as one of the 
Common Lav,,1 traditions. On that basis alone any change to the principle 
would be the cause of public outrage. There are many advantages, to a public 
court system, for both the system itself and for the public. The public can 
play a useful role in the justice system by making tlle courts publicly 
accountable, thus justice is more lil~ely to be administere(l fairly. Publicity 
can also help the actual process of administering Justice, it ma.y encourage 
~ .. vitnesses to come forv,larcl and it can act as t>Otli a punislunent ancl a 
t1eterrent. 
The Publicity Principle can also be just.if ied on the grounds that an open 
court system is fundamental to a democratic society ancl is tlrns important 
for the protection of the public: from possible abuse of state pov.Jer It gives 
the public: access to the law and t>uilds up public trust in the system and 
ultimately in the state. Finally in some instances it gives the public an 
emotional outlet. 
Some of these reasons are more persuasive than others as a justification for 
the Publicity Principle, but it 1s the fact that all have some validity v1hich 
entrenches the principle so cleeply in our society. It would be totally 
inconsistent TNith the principles of a democratic society if justice were 
administered behincl closed doors. 
It is for this reason that it is so important to analyse the exceptions to tlie 
principle V{hic:11 are accepted under Nev,, Zealand law. 
27 
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PART II - AREAS TO WHICH THE PUBLICITY PRINCIPLE MAY NOT 
APPLY 
28 
The Publicity Principle states the general presumption that court 
proceedings should be conducted in public. Occasionally tllough, special 
circumstances dictate that this presumption be rebutted in favour of 
procedures designed to ensure justice is aclrninistered fairly in t11ose 
particular hearings. These procedures vvhKh provide exceptions t() the 
Publicity Principle will be examined in Part II I of the paper. 
Hov,,ever .. in Nevl Zealand them are tr. .... ,o areas of lav,, in ,qhicJ1 this 
presumption oi openness has been reversed Court proceedings relating to 
tlle family law and to juvemle off ending are not subject to tlle Publicity 
Principle. This part of the paper will examine these exemptions ancl the 
reasons v,,hy t11e principle ,joes not apply . 
The Family Courts and the Youth Courts are specialist courts T..,.,1hich have 
been set up in Nev,,1 Zealand ,,....Tith juriscliction over these areas. "Quite of ten 
tt1e reason for the establishment of such [spedalizecl] courts is to enahle 
exceptional proce,:iures to be applied vvhic:h do not comply -..,\1ith normal 
standards of justice."7i This is true of these two particular courts in New 
Zealand v,.rith respect to the publicity requirements, as both the courts are 
essentially of a closecl nature. 
_.A_.rticle 14( 1) of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
states that the minimum requirement of openness in court proceedings is 
that "any juclgement renderecl in a criminal case or in a suit at 1a,,11 sl1all l)e 
made public: .. .. The .. 8 .. rticle allows only three exemptions to this minimum 
requirement: judgrnents do not have to be public v.,,here tlw interests of 
juvenile persons require that they should not be, ,.vhere the proceedings 
concern matrimonial disputes or Vlliere the proceedings concern tlw 
gu.arclianship of children. Under Article 14 t.i-1ese areas could also l)e exempt 
from the general rule that hearings should be public on tlle grouml~: of tlie 
interests of justice or of the private lives of the parties . 
71 A tove n 1, 144 
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Thus it vvould appear that Article 14 enables St3.tes to completely exclude 
these areas from the Publicity Principle, while all other areas must comply at 
least vvit11 the minimum requirement of a public judgment. Tllis is tlle 
approach used in New Zealand. Alt.ernatively States could use a case by case 
approach, so that the Publicity Principle applied to the area, but that 
individual cases could be exempted from all or some of the requirements of 
t11e Put>licity Principle. It is this approach v,1llic:l1 is now usecl in Canada v11itl1 
regard to juvenile offending. 
A) THE POSITION IN NEW ZEALAND 
The scheme of the Nev,, Zealand legislation that deals vv1t.h the Famllv Court ..... ; 
proceedings and proceedings against juvenile offenders are basically the 
same. The Family Proceedings Act 19,:30 and the nevv Children, Young 
Persons and Tl1eir Families i~ict. 1969, V·ll1ic:h comes into force in November 
1969, both restrict the openness of proceedings. In both the Family Court 
and the Youth Court, only people directly concerned with the hearing are 
permitt...ed entry. Members of the general public are excluded. unless the 
jw:lge gives them permission.72 
i·iccreclited ne,h.TS media reporters are allowed to attend hearings in Youtl1 
Courts only 73_. although they are not permitted to report details of any 
proceedings ~Nithout tlie court's perr.nission.74 atl(l can never print tlie name 
of the child or young person appearing tiE>f ore the court, or any details Vv"hict1 
v,,ould identify tllem.75 Theoretically tllis provides a c:hec1~ on tlle system, 
72 Section 169 of the family Proceedings Act 1980, and s166 and s"}29 of the 
Children, Young Persons, end Their fe.milies Act 1989. Se·~tion 27 A of the 
Guardianship Act 1968 .. and s27V Social Securities Act 1964 provide similru· 
pt·ohibitions in their relative jurisdktions. ( s23 Adoption Act 195~> prevents 
any media inspection of adoption records.) .,..., 
•· ) Section 329 of the Children .. Young Pet·sons end Their f tt.milies A ..::t. 1989. 
74 Section 438 of the Childt·en, Young Persons and Their families Act 1989. 
"ll:··hich applies to both ·~ourts under the Act. Thet·e ru·e some exceptions to this 
rule if the report is for the bona fide use of related professional bodies( 
s438(2)) 
75 Section 438(3) of the Children .. Young Persons a11d Their families Act 1989. 
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but in practice this l)an on reporting will generally stop journalists attending 
hearings. 
Where proceedings concern the st:1.tus oi a marriage_. the Family Proceedings 
,.A,.d 1980 allows the media tJ"J report the name and address of tl1e parties_. the 
name oi the presiding judge and the order made by the court, unless the 
court orders ot11erv,1ise. 76 
Publications of a bona iide proiessional or technical nature can be made 
providing they are intended ior circulation to members of related 
professions.77 Also some criminal proceedings relatecl to tl1e family lav.., area 
are not protected as difierent policy consiclerations apply in crinunal 
matter~;_?s 
Appeals from these c:ourts are heanl in the High Court and Rule 696 of the 
Hilih Court Rules states that v1here a court is heannq a case on appieal, it u u 
shall have all the poz,rers arid -:jisc1·etions of the tribunal whose order or 
decision is appealed against -
a.) To hold the hea1·ing or any pru·t of it in private; and 
b) To make orders prohibiting the publication of any report or the 
des<~ription of the proceedings or a11y pa1·t of them. 
B) THE REASONS FOR THE EXEMPTIONS 
1) Tbe Family Law Area 
Historically in the family law area there T...vas some tradition for public 
hearings. In the English case of 5'cott v J·;::r"Jtt the House of Lords held that 
puNic access could not bE> restricted when hearings concerned divorce 
76 Section 159 family Proceedings A,~t 19BO. 
'7'7 n . 1 . r {,:: \ • • ::-ec:t1on b~u_.1 fo.mily Proceedings Act 1930, and Section 438 of the 
Children, Young Persons and Their families Act 1989. 
78 See sl69(1) family Proceedings Act 1980. 
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applications, l)ec:ause t11ese hearings affected t11e status of tt1e parties, and 
the public: had a general interest in this which could not be exc:luded.79 
Similarly in the Privy Council case of }ff,.-:P/J,&fS>.').lJV }J...'":..!:}'J,&f .. 0.?J'J._ it was decided 
that divorce hearings should t>e held in open court. so 
So long as divorce, in contrast ~,.ith marriage, is not permitted to be a 
mattet' of agreement tet':leen the pa1·ties, the publi(: at large .. . a1·e 
directly interested in them, affecting as they do, not only the status of 
the two individu.':tls immediately concerned but .  not remotely when te1~en 
in mass, the entire social structure and the preservation of a '}"lholesome 
family life throughout the community. 
The court in s,.":ott v ,S'c(Jtt decided that proceedings concerning ,Nardship_. 
and the relationship t,etween guar(lian and vvarcl .. v .. 1ere of a different. nature 
to divorce procee(lings and TNere held to be "private family disput~s" which 
had "no relation t1:> the public administration of justice".81 
31 
In 1g15, a ,jivorce t1earing v .. ,.as l1earcl in camera . in tlie Nevv Zealancl case of C 
v .(t2 The court while accepting that the general principle v,,as that such 
hearings should usually be held in open court, held tl1at in tl1is country 
section 65 of the Divorce i·ict 1908 gave judges the power to exclu.cle the 
puNic from divorce proceedings when tl1is vta.s in the interests of puNic 
(lecency and rnorality .s:3 
The early legislation allov.,recl hearings to be private only when tl"lis VvTa.s 
necessary to protect tlie puNic morals. Gradually societ.y·s at.titucle of the 
79 Above n5 . 436 . 
80 Above 118 .  201 . See also the ea1·1ie1· discussion of this ca.se in Pa.rt I (A). The 
court held that in this case the divorce proceeding had not t.een heard in 
open <~ourt.. tut stated that the di vor(:e we.s not void because of this . 
81 Above nS, 442 . to an extent this point is incoq)orated into N'e~t Zealand Law 
b:t s1~>9 of the family Porceedings A(:t 1980. 
82 Above n 6. 
83 The case 1tas a suit for nullity of the mru't'iege on the grounds of 
impotency. 
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morality of divorce changed so that it came to t>e seen as essentially a 
private area which vvas merely regulated by the courts. Thus by 1939 the 
courts lrn.d accepted that the parties should have some rights to privacy an(l 
a sitnilar provision trJ the present day section 169 of the Farmly Proceedings 
i\.ct 1980 was enacted. 
There is not then the same tiist,:)ric:al t>asis for the application of the Publicity 
Principle to the family lavv as there 1s in other areas. Hov,,ever many of the 
other reasons for tJ1e Publicity Principle do apply to Family Court 
proceedings. Family Court judges should be publicly accountable as ttie 
decisions vvhich t11ey rnal:.e can affect people's lives to a great an extent, 
espeC1ally v1here the custody of children is involved. 
Family proceedings commonly necessitate public policy considerations being 
examinecl.. for exatnple wlwn the court cletermines 'vlT11at is in the t>est 
interests of the child. Yet public debate about proceedings is very l1m1t.E>d 
due to the restrictions on media and public access to the Farmly Courts. This 
means that judges have little feedbact from the community and there is not 
t.11e sarne process facilitating t11e generation of norms as t11ere is in otlier 
areas of la\11. 
The Family Courts determine and ascertain law and it is no less important 
for meml)ers of tlie public t(> l:.now t11at law than it is in any ot11er area, 
except possibly the c:nrninal lavl. "Because the courts are closed t(> the public 
generally, it must result in t11e community not being able to ascertain tJie 
attitudes of the courts and the operation of the legislation."84 
The principle that 'justice must l)e seen to be done·, may have a more limited 
application in this area. The f amity is largely seen as a private sphere where 
state interference should be tept to a minimum. At the same time the state 
llas almost a monopoly in tlle a:::pects v.Jt1ic:l1 it does regulate. It is not as 
essential that justice is seen to be done in this area as in cnminal 
procee(jings, a5 U-1e state is unlikely to abuse its power in sucb a significant 
way as is theoretically possible in the criminal area. Yet there are decisions 
84 pz,..1 Guest and M Gut·v1ch £.'ivor·ce Lti Aus!rBlis. (1979), 163. 
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whicl1 can have a proiou.nd ef iect on the life of an individual or child tl1at 
this reason is stHl significant. 
It can be seen that parts of the rationale for the Publicity Principle do apply 
to Family Court hearings .. and certainly there is not a consensus of opinion on 
the closed nature of these hearings.85 
[T hiere a1·e real dangers in allovring p1·0,;::eedi11gs to t>e, in effe(:t, ·sec1·et' 
proceedings. The element of secrecy does much to excite the imagination 
of some members of the public v;rho t·egard it with a high degree of 
suspicion. 
One of the main arguments propounded by the advocates of open farnily 
hearings is that the family is one of the most basic institutions of our sooety, 
so it is in the puNic: interest ttiat the put>lic is involved in hearings 
concernirni the regulation of the famil~, unit. This is especiallv the case as so u u , ' 
many people can be affected by the decisions made in the court. i·in 
iiustralian juclge in 1955 said in respect of adoption disputes that.86 
[t h1e publk: ought to have the opportunity to wato:::h a11d ,::;1·iti(;ise the 
operation of social legislation such as this, Tvhich so profoundly affects 
the rights and indeed the whole lives, of all the pa1·ties to every adoption, 
and \i'hich may profoundly affect the lives of many of their relatives as 
well. 
~/ilhile there is a persuasive basis for the application of the Publicity 
Principle, justice in the Farnily Courts cannot l)e seen to be done in Nev{ 
Zealand today. The reason ior these closed proceedings is the belief that 
there are factors which are of greater import:1nce than the Publicity 
Principle .. which must be protected. 
The individual's supreme right t(> privacy in the iamily area overndes the 
public: right of access t;:> the Family Courts. This protects the notion that the 
family is a private area rather than one of public ,::onc:ern .. while still allovving 
85 Above n84, 163. 
86 Av C.S (No 1) (1955) VLR 340,361 per Sho11 J. 
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tl1e state some means of regulating certain aspects of family relations. In 
more recent times society 11as begun to recognize that the family is not a 
tota.lly private sptiere, for example ,;,,1,1ith the increased reporting of incest and 
domestic violence, yet the essentially private nature is still seen as 
paramount, except in the more e~i.reme c:ircumstances.87 
Another concern wl1icl1 is protected tjy tlw closed nature of the courts is that 
proceedings in the Family Courts are of a more informal nature. The parties 
sl1ould feel free to speak candidly to the judge and should not be intimidated 
by the presence of the public: or in particular the media. The Family Court 
procedure v..,as specifically designed to t>e sensitive to tl1e parties needs and 
ti:) act alrnost as a social agency, providing cou.nseling and mecliation facilities. 
Tl1is development vvould not be consistent with open 11earings at V?tiicl1 the 
media i;..vere free to publish reports of the proceedings. 
Finally in Nevv Zealand there is a no fault basis t) divorce applications, 
11owever if tl1e media were free to publish reports of proceedings tl1is could 
jeopardize the no fault principle, depending on the standard of the reporting. 
The aim of ttie Act is to stop "publication of possiNy emN:~rrassing material 
about court applicants in scandal-hungry nwvvspapers"88 
There are valid arguments for and against the application oi the Publicity 
Principle to tliis area of t11e la-vl, tiu.t the private nature of t11e proceedings 
are seen as the overriding iact,.)r . 
2) JuvenjJe offending 
According to Article 14 proceedings concerning juvenile ofienders can be 
clo:::ed if the private lives of t11e parties require this, and the judgment need 
not be made public if that is in the interests oi juvenile persons. This can 
provicie a f ramewort for countries to mate tlie area of juvenile off en(jing a 
87 Diffet·ent considet·ations apply to these criminal areas of the family La"ll:r. 
Domesti(: violenc:e 81legations may be prose(uted in put:-lk, but incest 
charges are heard in camera to protect the identity of the c:hild. 
88 P Tennison family Cout·t -The Legal Jungle (Tripart Ivla1·keting Pty. Ltd 
1983), 91. 
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blanket exemption to the Publicity Principle, and it is this approach v,,hich 
New Zealand lavv has adopted. 
Juvenile oif ending requires tlrn.t the courts sometimes determine lav,,, and 
social norms or puNic policy, just as proceedings against adult offenders do. 
This area also requires that justice is done and is seen to be done, but it may 
t,e of even greater importance for juvenile off enclers, as they are often less 
able to help themselves, and are more lil~ely to be the vKtims of 
circumstance. 
However .. tlwre is not tlie traclition in tliis area tliat hearings are conduct.eel 
publicly. New Zealand est.abhshecl Cluldren·s Courts under the Child V'1elfare 
i·ict in 192 ::,. Before this time cases concerning juvenile off enders were heard 
in the ordinary courts .. albeit sometimes in chambers.89 From tlie time that 
tlwse separate courts , .. ,,1ere est.atilisl1ecl 'Nith juriscliction over cliilcl ancl youth 
off enders, there have been restnct.1ons placed on the openness of their 
proceedings. The nev,, Children, Young Persons and Their Farnilies ii.ict 1989, 
still contains these restrictions. 
In Nev./ Zealand, then, traditionally these courts have been closed to the 
public. Hov-,ever in Britain where children ·s courts have existed since the 
14th Century9°, there was a much greater reluctance to closing the 
proceedings. Glaclstc,ne is quoted as saying, 91 
A certain measure of publicity for the proceedings of Courts of Justke 
seems to me to be desirable, e11d this no less for Juvenile Cout·ts thru1 for 
others. I should v1e-·;:;:r vlith considerable apprehension a state of things in 
whi·~h no notke v/82- taken in the public Pt·ess of the mode in irhi-:::h 
delinquent children ii:ere dealt ii•ith by the Courts of summary 
j urisdi <:tion. 
89 Above n 58, 347. 
90 In the 14th Century the Chamberlain ·s court in London dealt vrith child 
811d youth offending. See above n58, 347. 
91 Repot·ted in LXXXV JP 126 (1909) a.s quoted in above n58, 347. 
·,c;: 
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The situation was changed in 1933 and is now similar to the position in this 
countrv. 
' 
In Canada, the position has recently been reversed. Prior to the Canaclian 
Charter of Rights, the courts held that section 12 ( 1) of the Canaclian Juvenile 
Delinquents i·ict 1970, v,.1hich stated that trials of children shall tate pla(e 
"'Nithout publicity", meant that juvenile trials must be held in camera.92 
Thus the pre-Charter position v1as that the Publicity Principle dicl not apply 
to juvenile trials. 
In 1962, aft.er the introduction of tlw Canadian Charter of Rights .. tlw courts 
decided that section 11 paragraph d( 4) of the Charter vlhic:h gives everyone 
charged v..1it.11 an offence the right to a "fair and public hearing", has changed 
the position in this respect. 
concerned a.n 
application for a declaration that section 12 ( 1) of the Juvenile Delinquents 
Act 1970 ,.·,,as inconsistent ·with section 11 of the Charter. The court held that 
t.11e V·lOr<js in section 11 (,j) of t.11e Charter applied to ctiiWren to guarantee 
that ~1vhen charged Vl1U1 an offence they are entitled t(> a "fair and public 
hearing". In effect tl1is allows members of the media and the public to be 
present_. although the media cannot report anything ,..vtiich v,.10uld disclose U1e 
child's identit.y.94 Tlw court recognised that tt1ere Vlould still be some cases 
where in camera hearings were necessary to "protect social values of 
superordinate importance_ .. 95 It was not thought that this justified holding all 
juvenile cases in camera.96 
The superordinate importance of being e.ble to hear juvenile trials 1"r1· 
came.r.~ is not doubted. But 11;:hat superordinate importance is there in 
92 See [:B" v .l'?ic· ("::~~en (1981 ) 62 CCC (2d) 107 . 
93 Pe Edman-tCJn .}JUrti.·.,_9./ -~:n.f Attorr;,_·e.P-fic-riers.l for· Altief't!i" -et -5:l (1983), 4 CCC 
(3d) 59 . 
94 Rc.ginav F:J(l 982) 68 CCC (2d) 285. 
95 Canadian Charter of Rights Annotated vol 2, 16.4 - 2"3. Under sl of the 
Charter public accessibility to hearings <=an be restt·i<::ted on this ground. 
96 Above n93, 69. 
holding all of such trials L"l c8.mera? The rationale for the blanket rule is 
the pt·otection of the d1ild. That protection ca11 be secured in individual 
cases by the pt·esiding judge vi'ithout a requirement that all such trials be 
held i1i c&.!Ii:&t"8.. Such a rule is inconsistent 1v;rith the right to e. public: 
hearing. 
Tl1e court clec:iclecl t.11at section 12 ( 1) of the Juvenile Delinquents Act 1970 
shoulcl be read by replacing "shall" with "rnay", so that judges have the 
discretion to order that a hearing should take plac:e in camera v.,hen it is 
necessary for the protect.ion of the child. 
In Canada then, sinc:e the Charter of Rights •w-...1.s introduc:ed 1t has been held 
tr1at the Publicity Principle does apply to the area of juvenile offending, 
although in individual cases exceptions can be made where necessary. The 
importance of tJ1e Pul)licity Principle l1as taken precedence over t.11e blanket 
protection of young off enders. 
In Ne·w Zealand the position is different, the present practice is that 
r->r(· ,·· ~ 6 '11. l}O"·-· ,~t)t·1 ··· ,. t·r11· t}.-r 1· 1 '11{ ~ n1· 1 ··· '>f fAt}(iArc- l1a•1 c:. tic:.At·l crrar1tA 'l t~ Y ,--t.-, tl' t H J-....tfv 1._ 0 .:, ._ . ..., (_.f:;' 1~ C) L ~ I,,. .... ,. ..__ • ._, C \' ..._. -·'-·.., b .l.J • ._.•._ .• I.) ~' • .Ct.. --~ _ .... _. 
exemption from the Publioty Principle.The policy reasons for this are two-
fold. 
First, it is thou.gl1t t11at young people sl1ou.ki not l)e brande(l at an early age 
as criminals and stigmatized; "no matter hov.,.• senou.s or how tnvial the 
charge, impulsive behaviour and youth seem t,.-:> go together."97 The 
justification then is that publicity in this area may severely breach the 
interests of justice, as t11e punislunent aspect of publicity may be too adverse 
on young off enders, man}' of vvl1orn will not re-off end. "Article 14, paragraph 
4. provides that in tl1e case of juvenile persons. the procedure shall be such 
as 1,vill take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their 
rel1abi1itation."9S Closed .hearings are a concession to the fact that young 
off enders are minors, and the restrictions on publication of proceedings 
97 Above n~>8, 34/:i. 
98 Above n1 146. 
J 
reduces the chances of the off ender being stigmatized at school or in the 
community.99 
[A] (:hild should be given the ,;:;han(:e to offend and be dealt ·~tith in 
camera before becoming publicly responsible and responsible for the 
bad upt>t·inging he has re·=~eived. No one -vrill ever lmo"vr ho~, mru1y 
useful adult membet·s of Ne~r Zealru1d society today were saved from a. life 
of crime ty the act that their first indiscret10n 'vta2 dealt ~rith ffrmly, 
fairly and in private in a Children ·s Court . 
Rhetoric indeed, t)ut tl1is may overstate the damaging effect of publicity as 
people are unlikely t1) remember the names of off enders, unless they knov,, 
tl1e youth. 
Sec:onclly it is t)elievecl tl1at lwarings will be more successful if tl1e judge can 
speak candidly and openly about the person·s background and situation, 
without risking U1is material turning up later in the neVvS stories. A public 
hearing may reduce the effectiveness of the court by increasing the 
formality ancj making the youtl1 .. and any v?itnesses, less vvilling t0 spec.1k 
freely. 
Another reason wtiich has t,een sug2"ested 1s U1at publlcitv "mav create u , , 
·young heroes· ~Nhose tielrn.viour V-lill t,e copie(j_. or at least l)ecome regarded 
as normal .. through the frequency of its description in public:."! oo This latter 
reason is not very persuasive as it could apply alrnost equally well t(:, adult 
off entjing, but it is not a realistic: argument against the open administration 
of justice. 
Them are justifications for these closed proceedings_. especially as the 
legislation does provirie, at least theoretically_. some checks.101 
99 Above n58, 350. 
100 Above n58, 348. 
101 Reporters are a1lov;red in the Youth Court, also the judge can admit entry 
to other members of the public, s 433 end s329 Children, Young Persons .. a.nd 
Theit· families Act 1989. 
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Coodusioo 
There are obvious parallels betv,,een the procedures which apply to the 
Family Courts and those used in the Youth Courts, and the reasons for those 
procedures. Juvenile ofiending and the family law are two areas which have 
been exempte\j from the Publicity Principle_. even though in general the 
rationale for that principle applies to tt1em. There are, ho-i;,1.1ever other 
paramount factors .. ,Nhic:h Parliament have seen as outv.,eighing the need for 
publicity. The overriding considerations are tl1e protection of private rights 
and the safeguarding of the nature of the procedure usecl by the courts. 
It is not accepted uncontroversially that these areas should be totally 
exempt from the Publicity Principle. One possible reform .,Nt1ich could protect 
many of these concerns would be to allow the judges to make public their 
(lecision and reasoning in cases w11icl1 were of public importance. While tl1is 
is not a total solution - as for example it Vloulcl not significantly enhance 
public accountability because the Judges would decide wluch judgments 
should be made public - it v,,ould serve to educate ttie public about that 
aspect of tl1e law and t() some extent about the procedure of tl1e courts. It 
V-lould also facilitate public det)ate Vlhich ,;Nould help in th,s, development of 
social nonns. 
An alternative reform v11ould be t:) adopt an approach similar to the one 
which is used in Canada in respect of juvenile offenders. This v.,ould mean 
tl1at the Publicity Principle applied to these areas, but tl1at the exceptions to 
the principle were applied on a case by case basis ,,qhere they v,1ere 
necessary. 
Perhaps these considerations lead to an even more basic question of 
v1.1hether the court system is the appropriate forum for either of these areas? 
"It is no.,v1.1 vl1dely accepted that the cherisl"1ed ideal of the tlwrapeutic social 
agency to help children in trouble is unrealistic: and inappropnate ior o.n 
e-ntitv that callf; itself a cc,urt."102 ' 
102 Coundl on the Role of Courts . Til-~.l;!o!eof-C.cmrtsin Amc-rk:gn Si_,·det,v (St 
Paul, Minn : ~!est Pub. Co 1984), 138. 
PART I I I - THE EXCEPTIONS TO THE PUBLICITY PRINCIPLE 
Tlw principle tt1at justice in our courts must l)e administere(j openly an,J in 
pu.t)lic has been examined in Part I of this paper. While t.llis principle is of 
constitutional irnportance in encouraging tlle fair and proper running of our 
justice system, it is inherently necessary for such a principle to ha-ve some 
exceptions if it is to pro<juce overall fairness in tlle court system. There •01ill 
a.1½'3.}'S be some situations m vv11ich other considerations overnde tlle 
Publicity Principle, and information concerning t.lle proceedings should be 
suppressecl_.103 
~!hile the broad prindple is that the Courts of this ,:ountry must .. a.s 
between the parties .. administer justice in public, this principle is 
subject to apparnnt exceptions. . But the exceptions are themselves the 
outcome of a yet mot·e fundamental principle that the chief object of the 
Cout·ts of justi-::.:e must be to secure that justice is done ... As the 
paramount object must alvl'a)"S be to do justice, the general rule as to 
publicity, af'ter all only the means to a11 end, must accordingly yield. But 
the but·den lies on those seeking to displace its application in the 
pa.t·ti(:ulat· (:a.se to malrn out that the ordina.t·y rule must 8S c,[11"&·cessit,vbe 
superseded by this para.mount consideration. 
i·.rticle 14 of tlw Convention on Civil an,j Political Rights recognizes tl1is 
reasoning by admitting some exceptions to the general rule that court 
proceedings should be heard in public. These exceptions state that in both 
civil ancl criminal cases the press and the public can be excltH:led irom all or 
P·a t·t ·'Jf tll ~ nr ~. (·;:,;:, ··11· 1·10·::; t,'i tJ1P. ;:, ~ct-Ht·1t ,-·tr1· ··-tly f.1;:,,·µ,~.;;-c,.t·~;r 1· 1·1 tl·1"' (· n1· ~11· ·'Jt·1 <'if th .-. • -. -· \... -· t:- r-· •.)._ .. _........ o--, ..... - -· ..,.,;\._._. .:, . '·-·-· . .... .......... .:.._,'=-._ ' • v ... ,1-· L ,... .._. -· t::" 
court in speoal circumst.ances where publicity wou.lcl prejudice the interests 
of justice; or for reasons of morals, public order.. national security in a 
democratic society or when the interests of the private lives of the parties so 
require. 
1 o~; Above n6 .. 437-438. 
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"[I Jn no case is ·c:losing· the trial to be allowed to prejudice the defendant's 
right to a fair trial."104 Also Article 14 still requires the minimum public 
justice component Urn.t all juclgments renclerecl in civil or criminal hearings 
shall be made pu.t)lic, except in very limited c:1rc:u.mst:1.nces.105 
The laV·lS of New Zealand also recognize that it is necessary that there are 
exceptions to the Publicity Principle. In the civil area exceptions generally 
f :::1.ll within the c:ou.rts inherent jurischction to mat.e any orcler necessary for 
tlle administration of justice1 o6, altliough there are also some statutory 
exceptions.107 
In the criminal area. Parliarnent has le..:,islated so that the courts no lonqer · 0 u 
have this unfettered discretion. Insteacl the Criminal Justice i· ...ct l 9o5 allOVl3 
the courts to make exceptions to tt1e principle of the public administration of 
justice only if the case fits within one of tlw set circurnstances. 
Suppression orders vary from suppression of the names of the parties or 
vlitnesses .. or censorship of evidence, through to the extreme situation oi the 
(··::Or·;:, b;:,1·no 1·1··-~11·r11·1·1 ,.~,n·1···r'4 1tl1·::.t 1·,~ pr,~r-~6 -11·1·1g'" 1·11 ~ ~1·).-;::.,j '····1 '11·t .)  . _.e,1,,.0._. •J b t:'CJ ... ....,:.. I;;' C.a. \ • C.\. .:i, • ,) .•. _.yl._ ~ c . ..... '"' ,:. .•. ·- • .... •Jt.:. -·· 
·while it is essential that the courts have thit; control over the openness of 
proceedings ii the system is to wort efficiently and fairly_. this control does 
open the system tl) possiNe abuse. Courts may use these pov,lers in 
circurnstances ~Nhere t11ey are not t)e justified, or the court may mate an 
order vvhicll is ·wider tlian is nec:essarv. 
' 
104 Haj1 NA Noor !•.•luhammad "Due Prncess of LaT1 for Pet·sons Accused of a 
Ct·ime" from Henkin (e,j) £~·.e !11"!E-t'l1"Bt1011B.l Bill o[i?ig.h!s(l 981 ), 149. 
105 The only exceptions to this are those discussed in PartlL nc1.me1y where 
the interests of juvenile persons other1;rise requires, ~rhere the proceedings 
concen1 matrimonial disputes, or ~rhere the prnceedings (~oncern the 
guardianship of O::::hi1dren. 
106 This includes cases Vlhich are being heard on appeal in the Court of 
Appeal. See R42 Court of Appeal Rules. 
107 See the discussion of the family Proceedings Act 1980 m Pai·t II. 
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The reasons V•Thich are used t,:) justify suppression orders are framed very 
v..ridely108, so that it is possible for t1'1e exceptions to be used as a "handy 
Nantet" to suppress information ~N:llich does not really fit within one of 
these reasons t)ut v.,hic:11 may be embarrassing t{) the state.109 The situation 
is more prone to abuse as of ten .. all tl"1e usual checks and t>alanc:es have t>een 
removed. For example_. it is not possible for tl'le public: to check_. whether 
evidence is lil(ely to endanger the security and defence of Nw,N Zealand, if 
the put>lic and the rnedia are exc:ludecl ·when tllat evidence is heard. 
¥lhile it seems drama.tic to discuss the possibility of abuse by the courts, tl'lis 
danger ~Aras realized in the crirninal context in 1962 .. four years after New 
Zealand ratified thE:- International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 
Moller J made an order prohibiting the public and tlle media from attending 
a court hearing_. suppressing all the details of the case_. ancl allov,,1ing the 
publication only of the fact that a man had l:>een sentenced. This draconian 
use of the court's powers w-a.s condemned by the Court of Appeal in TJ~1-& 
,-q_·t-,·-, ;;.-,·-l,~·;;.·:,·fit,£.7 ,.~;.-) t-r.,·-, t'"';( ft,') t;· TT ,I ff,? t'"t-,,!H,• _{:'.!"I fl.!"I t-,;-/11 0 .J...f'.J \.·.LI \. .... .,.LI._ 11'.J.J,5 °1.•'\. :J 
1
.,_ .. .,.-_, LI hi '\.·'..U \! .J'j L•Fa. :.J .i.J \.• ~v '\.• \.•.J.J \.•.J LI.J. 
In the civil context interlocu.tixy orders made in t11e High Court in IB.t11sle.f 
of P...,.r.&ig.lJ Af.f.:1/..rs v .B..-:?1}.il-,...91 allowed secret evidence and submissions to t>e 
q1ven. and tc, remain secret even from the other p>arty t? tl'le case. ..... . 
Obviously t11ese are extreme examples v,1l1icl1 are unlikely to tJe repeated. 
and there is an appeal structure to remedy mistakes. However, often ~1\lhen it 
is the media v.,rho appeal a suppression order, by tl'le time t11e application is 
heard it is too late as tl'le original case has already been decided. 111 
108 For example see the dis(:ussion belo""vt in Pa.rt III (A) of the ex(:eptions in 
the criminal area. 
109 liie f..5rr,·sn,:l tiie Pres~r. Ille report of ct. joint 1;rorting P8rty of Justice a11,j 
the British Committee of the International Press Institute (Stevens & Sons 
1965), 19. 
110 Above n 50. 
111 This was the situation in both F·:1,~-ilmDtid l/err,:s._[\._"l._[l.~rs.. I.!d above n 27, 
and the B..t".08dc-aS"!Lf1g lot:t>Ot'B:tion above nSO. 
J 
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The following discussion will look at tl1e law relating ti::, these exceptions in 
both the civil and the criminal conte1.i._. although the focus will be on the 
criminal lav,l as this is 'Nhere the exceptions are more frequently used: and 
V.Jhere any abuse of the court pov.Jers V>lould be the most dangerous. The 
extent that these exceptions infringe on th,s, application of the Public:it)r 
Principle will be analysed, and some possible ref orrns 'Nill be discussed. 
A) THE EXCEPTIONS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 
Prior to l 9t;.S the statutory provisions dealing vvith suppression orders in 
criminal cases ,;,.vere scattered through a number of statutes. Courts also hacl 
the power uncler their inherent jurisdiction, t.o make any order necessar}T for 
the administration of justice_. inclucling orders suppressing certain 
information 112 and orders to hold hearinqs in camera_ 113 ..... 
The exist~nce of tllis inherent jurisdiction alongside the statut0ry pov,,ers 
caused tnany interpretation problems as the scope of the two powers were 
not synonymous. In T .. ~y./{'J.r v A tt..?.rn~.v-{7...~n~.r .. 1./ Sir Richard Vilild CJ held 
tlrn.t while the statutory provisions gave tlw court powers . they did not "in 
the absence of a dear indication to the contrary" re(luc:e the courts inherent 
powers.114 
If tl1is Vlas correct .. trie inherent power v.,as dangerously wide in allowing 
any type of o:rde:r t(> l)e made if it ,Nas in the int~rests of justice. In the 
English case of S..t·,.)tt v :rcott 115 Viscount Haldane LC held t.11at this po,Ner 
Tv\To.S justified as the application of it did not depend on judicial discretion tJut 
on the demands of justice.116 Hov..rever tlle Earl of Halsbury thought t11a.t t11e 
power -..Na.s tfJO wide and could be misused, 3.S individual judges V>lould have 
different opinions as to when "the pararnount object could not be attained 
,Nithou.t a secret t1earing."117 
112 for ex8.mple see Ts:,v.lor v Attor11e.v-,5'e...r'J.et-:5:l[1975] 2 NZLR 67~,, 677. 
1 l"3 Above n 50. 
114 Above nl 12 .. 6:30 . 
115 Above nS. 
116 AbovenS, 435. 
117 Above nS, 442-443 . 
As has been mentioned, these misgivings about the inherent powers seem V) 
have t>een proven correct in the case of T.l1e .Bf(\.':rd(~7tst.ing [()~Of)fL?tJ,.,n v 
A tt~..?.r.ne7-(re1JeI.:1:l118 The "t,.)tal black-out" order '"ra.s given by Moller J as 
there were fears for tlw safetv of the accused. The case concerned a 
' 
relatively minor drug charge, but the accused hacl been giving the police 
information and there vvas a fear of reprisals. Tlie ju.clge ordered t11at the 
case Vv'c~S t..i:) be heard in camera, with no media representatives present m 
the court. There was also to be no publication about the trial except that a 
man had been sentencecl. The defendant's identity_. the charge, the sentence 
ancl t11e reasons for the proceedings l)eing 11eard in camera v.,ere all 
suppressed. The nature of this order flew in the face of the open Justice 
system and the need for publicity. The fact tl1at t11e judgment and sentence 
v,,ere suppressed, also contravened the minimum requirement of the 
Pul:>licity Principle given in Article 14 of tl1e Convention on Civil ancl Political 
Riqhts . . _. 
The Court of Appeal recognized this and held that the order went beyond the 
inherent jurisdiction by excluding the media and by teeping secret tlw 
sentence. The court decided, contrary to Ta,vJ,.,f, that the inherent 1unsdiction 
Vla.s restricted to tl1e scope of the statut0ry provisions.1 19 
In 198'.::, tl1e situation V-las clarified in t11e Criminal Justice Act 19fJS. 
Parliament brou.qht together most of the st.atutorv p1rovisions dealinP-0 ,Nith u u ' 
suppression orders, and enacted some new provisic>ns to deal with issues 
that had been raised in the courts, many of which were illustrated in 
Sections 1 :_,i3 to 141 of tJ1e Criminal Justice ,.e,.ct 1985 codify tJ1e court's 
po,Ners to make exceptions to the Publicity Principle in thE:- criminal 
juris,Jiction. The Act specifically states in section 136(5) tliat the provisions 
118 Above nSO. 
119 Above n:io, 128. 
120 Above nSO. 
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are in total substitution for the inherent jurisdiction which the courts121 
previously commancled, and that the courts have no powers other than those 
conf err eel by statute to make orders suppressing evidence or witnesses 
narnef;, or excluding the public or media from hearings_122 
The three sections 138, 139 and 110 of the Criminci1 Justice Ac:t now 
contam the source and scope of the po--vret· of a Court to forNd 
putlk:ation of matet·ial or to exdude persons from the Court in 
proceedings in respect of ar1 offence. 
1) The c.011.rt O.rde.rs 11.nde.r Seclit>.n 118-
a) The i>.rde.rs 
Section 13f,( 1) of the Criminal Justice i·.ct 19l3 5, codifies the 1)asic: Publtcity 
Principle as expounded in i1.rticle 14. It states tl1at courts should sit in public 
except in restricted circumst3.nces v ... There the court has the discretion t.) 
suppress certain information . 
The section allov..,s the courts in certain c1n:umstances ti) make t11e follov,nng 
orders on either a temporary or permanent basis . 
1) Orders forbidding publication of the v ... 'hole or any part of the evidence or 
tl1e submissions. 1Nhile this type of order may not seem as drastic as an in 
camera hearing, it is a significant exception to the Publicity Principle. Under 
tlie principle it is of vital importance_. that 'INhere possiNe, the evWence 
should be heard in public as this forms the basis for the court's d,s.c1sion . The 
decision cannot l)e juclged by the :public ii the grounds on V-lhich that decision 
is based are not known. This defeats the 'justice seen t[) be done· notion. 
121 The Criw.in,;il J1..1SU(e A(t 196:, <lefines .. ,~ourt" in section 2 as any court 
dealing --vri th a ct·immal prnceeding. 
122 ~{'· y ,r (.5.n a.x·u.s-&·,/) [1987 J 2 NZLR 240, 243. In that C8.se it vrn.s held that 
s 138 (5) did not pre1ren t access t, y counsel to the judge in cham ters vlhen that 
"v:ras essential tut that access could not be used for the put·poses of mcil~ing 
submissions about a cnmina1 case . 
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2) Forbidding the publication of the name of any 'Vvitness or any particular~; 
v,.1llicl1 wouh:l iclentify tlle v,,1itness_ 123 
3) St3.ting tl1at the hearing will take place in camera- tl1is means the judge 
can exclude any person not involved in court business either for the whole 
proceeding or for part of it. 
Sect.ion 12;N6) states that t11e "announcement of the verdict or decision of 
the court ... and the passing of sentence shall in every case take place in 
puNic:..." Tl1e sul:)sec:tion does allov,,1 tt1e court t!.) refrain from rnal-:.ing public: 
all the fac:ts or reasonim.' on VY11ic:h the decision 1s based m exceptional ..... 
circumstances. This is in accordance with i·irticle 14 if the strict 
interpretation of judgment. is adopted. 
b) The circll.msf.3n.,,.-:es when sllppressit)n .,,..,rders can be made_-
Sin(:e the purpose of the general rule is to serve the ends of justice it 
may t,e necessat7 to depart from [the principle of open justice J where 
the natut'e or dr·~umst8n<:es of the particular proceeding are such that 
the application of the general rule in its entirety would fustrate or 
render impra.ctical>le the a,dministration of justice or -..xrouM damage some 
other putlic interest for vlhose prntection Parliament has made some 
st3.tutory det'ogation ft'om the rule_ 124 
The circumstances in vv"hich a judge can make any such order are TY'lhen it is 
required l)y: 
- tl1e interests of Justice 
- public morality 
- tl1e reputation of any victim of any allegecl seatal offence 
- the reputation of anr;T victim of anv alh?.Qed offence of ext..()rtion I I ._. 
-the sec:uritv or defence of New Zealand. 
' 
123 See teloiv Pa1·t III (A) (1) (t>) and (2). 
124 Above n 15 .. 450 
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One reason for suppression in the criminal context is where it is in the 
interests oi justice, referring to either justice bet~Neen the parties or Justice 
in tl1e wicler sense. It may l:)e necessary in the interests of justice to clear t11e 
court ii the public a.re ea.using disturbances. 
Justice in the 'Nider sense may require that a v,Titness· evidence is heard in 
cainera and their name suppressed, ior the protect.ion of that person, but 
also so that in iuture cases witnesses v,lill come ion.vard l::.nov,1ing that they 
'Nill l)e protected. T11is reasoning cloes assume that in later cases witnesses 
vvill lcnov,, that this ,,..,ill happen. 
Another example of justice in the 1Nicler sense is where the court hears 
evhjence concerning fraud charges in camera so that the crime cannot be 
copied. 
Article 14 incorporates this ground, but gives it a more restricted reading_; 
ttie court can exclude ttie pul:)lic or tl1e press "t) the extent strictly necessary 
in the opinion oi the court in special circumstances v.,rhere publicity vvou.ld 
prejudice the interests of justice". Section 13& probably does not conflict 
vvitll Article 14 as it is likely that the court would ha.ve regard to this 
restriction implicitly, '1,,,11en mating an order. Article 14 also lists separately 
the ground of public order .. l)ut in Nevl Zealand this falls v,11thin the interests 
of ;ustic:e reason_ i 25 
If the evidence of a crime v,ra.s of sud1 a nature as to offend the public 
morals the courts V.,TOlJ.ld order that this evidence be heard in camera, and 
that it could not l:)e published. Tliis is an exarnple of the courts ascertaining 
the public's values on a matt.er. This c:ou.ld be one instance wllere publicity 111 
125 See G Nettheim Open Justice versus Justke (1983 - 1985) 9 Adel LR, 487, 
488-492. 
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previous cases may help judges tc, decide ~.hlhether suppression should be 
ordered_126 
This reason is rarely used in New Zealand today, and where eviclence of a 
sexual nature is suppressed it is on the grounds of protection of the victim 
rather than the public morals.127 
Hi) Pr(Jt-t?ct.if:~':l (}f t.l1-& .r-&putat.i(>.n {:•f .::"iN}7 v.ict.h11 of L91,~y all-&g&d s-&.,1.'7.lld off...~11ce (>.r 
f;,ff-&.tJ(:f.' Of f.'.J.1,,.?fliOJJ 
•6.rticle 14 does not specif icall), mention the victim ·s of allegecj sexual 
offences or offences of e}:.1:,xtion . altl1ough it rnc:orporates a ,;Nicier ground 
that is absent in section 13&, that the public can be excluded if it is the 
interests of the private lives of the parties. As section 135 is a code in 
respect of the circumstances in v.,hich suppression orders can be made, it 
actually acts t(., limit this grouncl t(i only the victims of these tvlo offences. 
The notion here is t0 protect tlle sensibilities of the victim~:. 
There is also an overlap in the sexual offences area 'Nit.11 section 375(4) of 
the Crimes Act 1 q61 as enacted bv the 196') amendment. This states that in . . -
cases involving sexual violation the court has tl1e discretion t0 mate an order 
forbid,jing publication of any account of the offence "if the court is of the 
opinion that tl1e interests of tlie complainant so require". 
Suppression of information can be required v.,hen it is necessary for the 
:::ecurity or defence of Nev,, Zealand. Tlus ground was originally enacted in 
the Official Secrets i~.ct 1951. In T .. 1yk)I v A tt(if.t}-&y-1,.';-&.t1i?rL'f.l 128 a court order 
had been breached that prohibited anything being published that would 
identify two secret ::;ervic:e agents 1Nllo v ... ·ere ,hntnesses in a criminal action 
126 Above n13.. 417. 
127 The prote<:tion of public morn.ls ,,::;,as used to supress some of the evidence 
heard against the Labour MP .. Gerald O'Brien who in 1976 iol8S charged with 
indecently assaulting tirn youths. See belovr in Pa1·t III (A) (2) . 
128 Above n112 . 
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against a defendant, charged under tlie Official Secrets Act 1951. The order 
v,,as made for tJ1e protection of the security of New Zealand, v.,hile the use of 
letters to ref er to eacli agent resulte(j in the trial l)eing a tile to l)e heard in 
public and reported in the media. 
There is the danger that this exception will be used by the prosecution 
Vlhen it is not really necessary. 129 It.is important that the courts do look int) 
the reasons ·why suppression is necessar}' for the security of the country. 
A1tl1ough it has also been questioned as to whether the courts are really 
qua.liiied to say ,Nhat is and what is not a matter of national security_ 130 
Article 14 limits this ground, the public: rnoralit.y ground and that of public 
order as only applying "in a detnocratic society". "1Nhile permissible 
limitations must always be very narrov,,ly construed an\j applied ... the 
reference to a democratic society underscores the especially restrictive 
character of the perrrnssible limitations on public trials."1:31 
c)Breacb t>f a.o order 
Ignorance of a suppression order is no excuse for breaching one, 132 although 
this may be taten in t:, consideration ·when a penalty is imposed. Any person 
Vlho cloes not comply v,1it11 an order under sections 136 tl) 140 is liable on 
summary ~onvic:tion t,) a fine of up t() $1 OOO, except in the case of the in 
camera hearings vv11ere any breach or attempted evasion of the orcler may 
be dealt with as a contempt of court. Previous sections relating to 
suppression on:lers allo~.qe,::l irnprisonment of up to ttiree months for a l:ireach 
of the order and while this is not a punishment in the i·ic:t, it is still 
tJieoretically a.vailable under contempt of court proceedings for breacli of an 
order for an in camera hearing. 
129 In A1torn.e,v-GE.·t1n·oJ v Leveller if.f...Rgo~111e_. a.bove n15 .. tl1e mage.zine 
reported suppressed information as a protest against the ·excessive use· of 
this type of prct"vision . 
1 '30 Above n109. 
1 ~il Above n104, 149. 
132 Poli.,"eV .r.l18.1l1ES St.81' [o. 1 !d( 196 5) 11 MLD 343. 
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According to leve.l.lf:'.r lvf..1g.:1..:--:.i.lJf:' for there to be a contempt of court 
punishable l)y imprisonment, the juclge must have made t11e orcler clear.133 
[W }here courts, in the interests of the due administration of justice, have 
departed in some mee.sure from the genere1 principle of open justice no 
one ought to be exposed to penal sanctions for criminal ·~ontempt of 
court for foiling to drai'l fill infet·ence or re(:ognise fill impli-:::ation a.s to 
what is permissible to publish about those proceedings, unless the 
inferen(:e 01· implication is so obvious or so familifil' that it may be said to 
speal:: for itself. 
Tlle contempt of (ourt charge was completely dismissed for this reason. 
In New Zealand t11e media cannot t)e excluded from criminal trials unle:::s it is 
in the interests of sec:uritv and defenc:e.134 The courts therefore have a much 
' 
more limite,j pov,.rer in this regard than that suggested t)y i\rtic:le 14. There 
are however . restrictions on v.,lrn.t the media can report, essentially at the 
clisuetion of the courts.135 
The me,Jia is considered to be the pul)lic·s representative in cases wl1icl1 are 
heard in c3mera, and their express mdus10n in the proceedings 1s aimed at 
being another c:hed.:. on the system. It attetnpts to ensure t11at justice is seen 
133 Above nlS, 45}. 
134 Section 13::;(}) Criminal Justic:e Act 1985. 
135 At·ticle 14 does not mention the powers of courts to restnct the 
publication of the reports of pro{:eedings. Haji N A Noor Muhammad stated 
that "[t }he Covenant pro·vision deals only v:rith the presence of the press at 
trial e.n,1 does not permit restriction on reporting by the press or other 
cover8ge of a11 y cnmmal proceedings ." Above n 104, 149. Hov:rever m N ev:r 
Zealand a.s has been seen, the courts have wide powers to restrict publication . 
Arti,:le 14 cannot mee.nt that there are to be no restrictions on publication e.s 
this i'lould rnnder meaningless the exceptions to the Publicity Princi:r,le that 
it does a11ov:r. 
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to be done and does not become a rnystery locked away behind closed doors. 
Before section 133 v.ms enacted by the Criminal Justice Act 19,35 .. the media 
cou.W l)e exclu.de,J if tt1e judge felt that this v,ms in the interests of justice. 
In practice thou!~h media on:,anizatfons rarelv have sufficient resources to ~ 0 ' 
enable a reporter to be present in court v,1hen there is a suppression order 
on publishing reports of the case. 
In .R v ~Y l~~-.lJ ao..-:used) the Court held that under section 13c, v.Jritten 
submissions can be received bv a court ,..vhen this is in the interests of , 
justice.136 In this Wc.1.y the evidence would not be 11eard l)y the media .. v,1tlicl1 
v.Jould reduce the effectiveness of the media presence as a chect. 
Applications for reviev,, of a suppression order can be made by the parties tA) 
an action or t>y memt>ers of the media.13? The latter allov.Js the media to t>e 
heard as a party affected by the order, although in some instances the 
practical effect of this right may be limited For eY:.ample in the i.1imerican 
'·'C>C-"'· "f ,.,,,.,,,.,_,.. 117,!)··-·n:.-n..c.r-1~,., •• c .. -~,,.,.,.,,,. .. -.,.,.,,,..~1~8 th'· n-vTr·r'C>r'·r's ..,pr-·'-r1l ,hT:c/C-
• .... ci . ._1'v 1..) {7.J {.-A,,..a.:":"" .J ~•-... Y°o/;:tf,L-1_,i{/V.J 01., 0 {/. ¥ .1 l.{f-· ... :f .J {/../ {..{/l1'..f {. ,_ · t:;' t;' \'~!)c.•. r-·'t' 0. _J )t1C.. • • iJ,,,J 
not heard until nine months after the conclusion of tlw criminal trial to 
vlhich the order related ancl the appeal was therefore dismissed. 
e) limilillit,os tt, t.he Orders 
There are two statutory limit1.twns t,:) the orders under section 130. There 1s 
a public right to search for and tate copies of the register of persons 
committed for trial and sentence 139 Hov,,ever if an order has been made to 
the contrary these i::letails cannot then be pul)list1ecl so tlw or,Jers are not 
subst.antially lirnited by tl1is right..140 
136 At>ove n122, 244. 
1'37 In Broa ... ~i-:-&ting [or,_rore.tion.. above nSO the action w-as brought by the 
Broadcasting Corporation end New· Ze,:ilend Ne"\i•"Spapers Ltd , ~··hile 
VJ! elHngton N e-z.:rspapers appealed against the order made in .. r:·v ff.7Jisc,ti [ 1981 1 
NZLR 316 .. 324, see Unreported 1~> :rv1a1·ch 19B2, Court of A1;peal CA 79/81. 
13::: .Globe Ne·w'S,_Paper Co. v .:S'u .. rerior Court 102 S. Ct. 2613 ( 1982). 
1 ·39 Crimimd Prnceedings (Search of Court Records) Rules 1974. 
140Atove nc-io, 127. 
Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1935 lays dovm exceptions for 
publication of material by or at the request of the police v.,hen there is a 
suppression order relating to that material. 
2) Name Suppression Orders 
i\rtic:le 14 of the Convention on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly 
consider the courts· ability to suppress the name of people connected v,lith a 
hearing. This may mean t11a.t tlw names of parties are not regarded as part of 
the Publicity Principle, so that no restriction is placed on the suppression of 
narnes; or alternatively i·irticle 14 may intend to include the names of 
parties ~Nithin the term 'hearing·_. so that an open hearing Vlould mclude the 
names of parties being publicly availaNe. In tl1is country tlie crimrnal courts 
have V.Jide powers t) suppress the name'.; of the acc:usEKl, ~i11Titnesses_. or the 
victim; Vlliich suggests that Nev,,1 Zealand law does not regard i·irticle 14 as 
limiting the courts poTvvers t,::i suppress names. 
Section 140 of the Criminal Justice Act 1 g,55 ernpov.,ers courts he3ring 
crirninal cases, to suppress "the name_. address, or occupation of the person, 
or of any other person connected vvith the proceedings, or any particulars 
likely to lea,j to any such person's identification."141 Unlike section 1.?>8, t11is 
section gives no indication of when courts should exercise this pov.Jer.142 
Name suppression orders can be made either permanently, if the applicant 
can shov,,1 strong enougli justification: or temporarily_: and tliey are commonly 
used on an interim ba.s1s ti) protect an accused until a verdict has bet?n 
reached. Breach of a section 140 order can lead to a summary conviction and 
a fine of up to $1 OOO. 
141 Seo:::tion 140(1) Criminal Justke A(:t 1985. This ca.n in dude Companies, see 
above n63, 194. 
142 Se(:tion 140 does not apply to offences of driving 't/hile under the 
inl1uence of drink or dru.gs. S61 Transport Act 1962 states that the court 
(:8.t1not suppress rn.~.m.es of su(h offenders unless there a1·e special reasons 
involved. See above Pa1·t I (B) (3). 
"'lilho steals my purse steals trash; ... 
But he that filches from me my good ne.me 
Robs me of that vthich not ennches him, 
And mekes me poor indeed."143 
Name suppression orders can be grante,J on an interim t,asis to protect tfo? 
name oi an accused person until the verdict has been reached. The 
deiendant can apply ior an order at the time of tl1e preliminary hearing on 
the basis that v,1ithout it they or their f amlly would suffer some particularly 
l1arsh detriment. 
Section 140 of tlle Criminal Justice Act 19fS5 is silent as to how judges shouM 
exercise their discretion to grant name suppression orders_. and judges differ 
considerably in t11eir interpretation of V·lhich factors are relevant and 
persuasive. The decision ti) grant or refuse a name suppression order can be 
appealed, but "[bJecause of tlle variety of human situations tlle matter must 
be left largely to tt1e discretion of the judge to v,1hom the application is first 
ma,Je."144 Tlrn.s an appeal v..rill u.sua.lly succeed only on the grounds that "tl1e 
Judge made a plainly v?rong decision ior some identifiable reason."145 
It is not clear v-1hether the amount of publicity that the accused will receive 
it; a relevant factor in the exercise of the discretion. iu1 accuse,j may receive 
greater publicity because of their standing in the community, the nature of 
tlleir job, tlle type of oif ence, or because of some other specific feature of the 
,.a,...~ n--N·· v i'.1?'./',;,-~ 146 1s a recent example of an application for namE.-•._ . ._.:i._. • .lJ'\..iJ.J • .,¥ 'I .J I. .J ........ 
suppression t)asecl partially on the eff ect.s of ,.videspreacl puNicity. 
143 "l Shakespea1·e [itilElh Act III Scerie 3. 
144 l).t1Jlv ..-.,1 Pulk".i· Unreported, 13 July 1989, High Court 1lellington :Registry 
AP 148/89, 5. 
145 Abo'v"'e n 144_. 5. 
146 Above n144 
Paul Dally 'Nas chargea v .. rith the murder of a young teenager named Karla 
Cardno. Dally"s application for name suppression v-las refused, and was also 
denied on appeal by both the High Court14? and the Court of Appeal.14B The 
application was made on the basis that there had been widespread publicity 
of the case and that the publication of the accused ·s name before he had 
pleaded v\rou.ld "t,e seriously clamaging ti:) tlle safety of the appellant l1imself 
and his family ."149 Psychiatric reports relating t::> tlle personal circumstances 
of the accused were also submitted in support of the application. 
Jeffries J in the Higt1 Court acknov,,leclged the significance of the widespread 
media attention given t.() the case as an argument supporting suppression 15°, 
although ultimately he decided that the District Court Judge ,,hra.s justified in 
ref using to grant name suppression on the basis of the Publicity Principli2 
atKl the free(lor.n of speecti.151 Hov-lever U-1e District Court JtKlge stated tlrn.t 
the "main reason for declining the suppression W?1s tllat tlle case 'Nas in the 
public spotlight and it ,,h.rould be wrong to mask the situ.ation."152 
In dech:ling whether t) grant name suppression tt1e courts must balance t11e 
detrimental effects of publicity on the accused and their family against the 
constitutional principles of the freedorn of speech and the open 
administration of justice. The effect of publicity as a punishment has already 
been recognisecl in the paper153, but as t11is punislunent of t11e accusecl ancl 
their family can occur before guilt or innocence has l)een decided, the area is 
especially controversial. 
In Nev,l Zealand t11e situation is particularly interesting as tlw law relating to 
name suppre~sion 1Na::; reformed in 1975, by the Lat)our Government.. The 
Criminal Ju.!::tic:e Amendment i~ict 1975 introdu.c:ed sections 45B t):) 45D int() 
14? Above n144. 
148 B5Jl.v v F'Olk-e Unreporte,j, 14 July 1989 .. Court of Appeal CA 204i89. 
149 Above n144.. 4. 
150 Above nl 44, 2 a.nd 4. 
151 Above n 144, :1-6. 
152 Above nl 44,3. 
153 See Pa1·t I (B) 0). 
tlle Criminal Justice Act 1954. Vvhile t.11ese provisions c:ausecl muc:11 political 
debate ancl -Nere repealed a year later by the incoming National 
governrnent154, the reform dicl 11ave merit. 
Tlle thrust of section 45B Vvas the prohibition of publication of the name of a 
person accused of an offence until tlw person v,m.s convicted_: if the person 
,Nas acquitted then tt1e prohibition v,,as rendered permanent. There ,,qere 
some exceptions enacted tJ.'.) tlus general prohibition: put>lication was allo,Ned 
if tlle accused did not T.,qant name suppression; or if t.11e court decided that 
publication \n.ra.s desirable for public interest reasons and ordered 
ac:corclingly. The court couJ,j make su.c:11 an order on its o, .. ·m motion, on tlw 
application of the prosecutor or on the application of a member of the public 
wllo reasonably believed that she or he, or a member of Iler or his family 
vvoulcl be personally prejudiced if the name of tlle accused v,1as not 
puNished_155 
The present day section 140 of tl1e Crilninal Justice Act 1985, makes the 
general presumption that names will be published, unless there are very 
goocl reasons ,:,,v11y publication shoulcl not occur. The 1975 refonn in effect 
reversed the presumption so that the general position was that publication 
should not occur unless there ..,,.,ere good reasons to the contrary. 
T11e l)asis of our present clay system is essentially tlie Pu.Nic:ity Principle 
itself. It is argued that a presumpt10n tovlarcls the suppression of names 1s 
an unjustified rnf ringernent of t11e principles of t.11e open administration of 
justice and of the freedom of speech_. bot.11 of which have historically been 
protected from such interferences. 
These justifications are not entirely persuasive especially when t.11ey are 
balanced against the arguments that do support this type of reform. 
Generally the reasons v..rhicl1 underlie tt1e Put)licity Principle cio not apply to 
154 The National Government repealed the provisions as they had prom1se<l to do this in 
their election manifesto_. essentially be-~ause they ,~;,ere seen as an infringement of the 
publicity Principle. for example see NZ Parliementar;r debates Vol 403, 1976. 118. 
155 Se<:tion 4~JB (3) Cnmine1 Justice Act 1954 e.s enacted by s 17 of the 
Criminal Tustice Amendment Act 1975. 
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t11e area of interim ·=;uppression of tl1e ac:c:used's name. Law can be made, and 
norms generated, V?.ithout the need to publish the name of the accusecl. 
Similarly judges T1qoulcl still be puNic:ly acc:ountat>le ancl the punishment 
aspect of publicity v.,ould be administered more fairlv v.Jhich v.,oulcl mean 
' 
that justice was seen to be clone. Thus the Publicity Principle applies t{) 
interim name suppression on the basis of tradition alone. 
The argument that this is an infringement of the freedom of speech is also 
wear.:.. In this country_. freedom of speech is not an unrestricted freedom, as 
there are other interests v,1hich are also protected The 1a~ . .1l of defamation 
protects people fron:1 false staternents 'Nliic:t1 could aff ec:t tlwir reputation. If 
charges are brought against someone who is then found ti) be innocent, this 
can have a far more detrimental effect on a person's reputation than 
defamatory st3.tements. 
In democratic: societies the belief that people are innocent until proven 
guilty is held to have at least the same com;titutional st1tus as the freedom 
of speech. The freedom to publish the names of the accused and subject 
them to tlw r::letrirnental effects tliis may cause .. is a breach of tl1e principle 
that people are presumed innocent until proven guilty. People should not 
suffer tlie punislunent of publicity until it has t)een proven before a court of 
lav ... • that they are indeed guilty. 
The publication of the name of a clef endant can lead t!) senous adverse 
eiiec:ts et;pec:ia11y in small communities. or where certain offences are 
involved. If the accused is acquitted they can already have suffered severely 
from the publicity. Acquittals are often not as v,ndely publicized, and some 
people may t11int t11at t.lle person was guilty, but somel1ov,l managed U> get 
off on a lecl1nicality·, as there is ·no smote v.,ritl10ut fire·. Thus it can be 
essential that interim name suppression orders are granted. While the 
rhetoric: of the court system is that an accused is presumecl innocent until 
proven guilty, the puni:;hment of publiC1ty can be meted out before a verdict 
is reached, witl1 often long lasting effects. 
This reasoning has been critiosed as tleing156 
156 The Dominion "Govt. should drop name suppt·ession measure" 15/5175 
a misunderst:1.nding of the fB.mous 'presumption of innocetKe· .. vrhic:h in 
reality only applies <luring the trial of 8. cha1·ge It would be vrrong to 
imagine that the innocen(:e of the a(:cused is presumed at evet·y othet· 
stage in the (:rimina1 prosecution. 
This argument is justified on t11e grounds that if the presumption of 
innocence always applied then no one could ever be denied bail as it ~Nould 
be wrong to imprison someone ~Nho was presumed to be innocent. It cannot 
be disputed that the court's power t-0 remand in custody does conflict V.Jith 
the presumption of innocence. Hov.Jever t11is measure is only use,J in cases 
·Nhere 1t is neces:;ary ki ensure tht? attendance of the a(cu.sed at the trial. 
The publication of names, however, is not usually a justified departure from 
the presumption of innocence.The reform suggested v..1ould al101N publication 
v..rhen it ·Nas required by Urn public interest. 
The punislunent of publicit;.1 is not only contrary to tt1e presumption of 
innocence .. it is also not applied on any equal basis. Cases are only publicized 
on t11e t,asis that tlley are ne,,vs1Hort11y. Tllis may mean that t.l1ey involve 
some v.Jell knovm person or that there is something V.Jhich is particularly 
unusual or horrific about t11e offence.157 
A greatet· amount of nev:rspaper space is alv:rays likely to be given to 
cases involving persons of renovm . 11;:ealth or social st811ding .... The 
amount of space given ... depends less on the gravity of the offenc:e or the 
culpe.bilit:r of the offender tlrn11 on the neiirs ·vB.lue of the story. 
vVhile publloty is part of the price of being in the public limelight, the 
increasing number of cases con1ing t,efore the courts, rneans that the meclia 
cloes not have the resources to cover every trial or even a large proportion. 
resulting in cases t>eing reported almost at random. Except in the instance of 
a big criminal case or of a hearing involving a renowned person, the 
likelihood of cases being reported can depend on such fad.ors as the 
availability of a reporter, the volume of other news on the day ancl the 
discretion of the Chief Reporter. As publicity of criminal trials has a punitive 
1:i? M Jones _.,.w..ti~sri·d.}:nzrr1811sm(Chichester : Rose 1974). 152-154. 
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effect this arbitrary reporting of cases does not sit v,,ell vvith the notion of 
everyone being treated on an equal basis by the justice system. 
While there is often adverse feeling when the courts order name suppression 
for a person v,,ho is in the public: eye, when a less renowned person would 
not be successful in a similar application, tt1is may not be a refled.ion that 
the courts are applying name suppression unfairly, but rattier t11at t11e courts 
re:3.lize that publicity is given on such an unequal basis. The reform 
suggeste(l vvould ernmre tl1at the punislunent of pul)lic:ity was not impo::;ed 
on anyone until there v,,as a conviction, and that it 'Nas never imposed if the 
person ...,Nas acquitted. 
i\nother argument against tl1e reform ...,Nas that if the media could not 
publish the names of accused or anything likely to lead to their 
identification, it v..rou.lcl be difficult for the meciia to report the story, ancl 
could even result in it not being published because of its reduc:ecl ne .... ,1ls 
value. However. tl1is overlooks the fact that these restrictions are onlv an 
. ' 
interim measure and if the clef endant v,ras convicted the media could then 
nu1t· 11· ,-.1-1 ·::> f 1111 ,-t ··  1-n ... t nr-P.~ ~ r1t r1-1 r-,,-t -~ f t11"' ~, ·-p.c· r-"'P r,1-tt::.(l 1-, ...,. t1-1µ 1-11p.,-11· ·-1 1-1·::qlP. r-·) :j 1:J.. _ .:-).} y . .1.'"i-- 1-· .··-~lJ • l! 1v.:1.I._J . . _.t.c. . .,:, .._.._1 'v'")I._.. .••• •• -·/ . ._. ·-•\. (; U •. 
l:leen c:oncluclecl, so it unlikely that this type of provision v ... ·ou.ld have such a 
Pr .-.1-..-,, 'll-11·j .-. ff P. .-.t '-..! V L ·- i;;- ._. t_ . .. 
Also interim suppression ,.vou.W not apply in every case. There is a (langer 
with blanl::.et ::uppression of name orders in that there may l:le circ:urnst3.ni:>?.':; 
vvhere it is in the public interest for the defendant's name t,.) l)e t.nown even 
m the interim. However, section 4~,B dealt v,1ith this eventuality_. as the judge 
could mate an or(ler allov,ling pu.t>lication.158 
Another problem 'i1>litl1 name suppression is that it could lead to speculation 
and rumour about the identity of the defendant in a particular casE:-. In small 
c:ornmunities .. or v.Jliere t11e defenclant is knov,m t,) t)elong to sorne class of 
people, the vvTong person may be suspected. vVl1ile the defamation la~,% 
could protect tllese people to an extent. tl1is alone would not solve tlie 
problem. However., section 45,B gave the Court the power to allow publication 
158 section 45B (3) Criminal Justice Act 1954 .. a.s amended ty section 17 
Ct·iminal Tustice Amendment Act 1975. 
if someone appliecl to tl1e court on the basis of some personal prejudice 
arising from the suppression, or ~Nhen the accuse,j applied for suct1 an order. 
It may seem unlil(ely that any accused person would apply for the court t0 
make their narne public_. but in practice t11is did happen v,1hen section was 
la-vv. 
In 1976 a doct,:)r, Ench Geringer, vlas charge(! with raping one of his patients 
during a gynaecological examination. Geringer agreed that his name should 
be published for the protection of other members of the profession. He v,,as 
later ac:qu.1tte,:i. 
i·inotller example involved Gerald O'Brien, a Labour party MP. In 1976, 
follovving an incident at a Christchurch motel O'Brien vva.s accused of 
indecently assaulting tv,10 males aged 16 and 17 years. i·iutomatic name 
suppression was given t,:) O'Brien under s4SB, but soon after O'Bnen applied 
to have tlle suppression order removed. His counsel summarised t11e reasons 
for the application as:159 
[fli1·stly, be(:e.use O'B1·ien had nothing to hide end had no intention of 
hiding_: secondly_. because he '7fl8Z concious of the position he held and, 
thirdly, because he vtle.nte,j to relieve other people of the ·turden of 
suspicion' '7fthich had been created by the media. 
The Magistrate hearing the case later ruled that O'Brien had no case to 
ansv,,er on the charge. 
Before the name suppress10n V{as lifted TV2 .. the Christchurch Star and The 
Press reported stories v,,1hicl1 it ,,.,,as later held contained details li}i:.ely to lead 
V::, the identification of crerien. T1No stories V•lere published in the papers and 
t,roadc:ast on tlie 1ie1hTS t:,y TV2. ()ne concerned t11e charges against an 
unnamed North Island MP in the Christctrn.rch Mag1·;tra.tes Court, wlule the 
ot11er stated that O'Brien had been admitted to hospital in Chriskhurch, but 
did not mention any court proceedings. 
159 "Court Lif'ts N'ame Ban on Gerald O'Brien .. Christchurch Star 13/6/76. 
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The charge against TV2 v.,1as dismissed, but the tv.,o papers ~.o\Tere fined $25,0 
each as they had stated that the MP v,,as a Labour Party politician. By this 
time the National Party ha,j repealed the relevant provisions and the charge 
v.,a.s referred to as "a pu.rel}T academic exercise" by counsel in the case.16° Mr 
lv1cLaren counsel for TV2 stated that the "very real difficulty an editix or a 
v.,orting journalist has in comp1lvinff v,lith [the Act] .. had been illustratec1.161 
' u 
Thif: example also illustrates anotl1er v.,ay that people who may be 
irnplicated because of tl1e suppression of the accused's name .. can clear their 
names. Dr A.M Findlay_. Labour spokesman on Justice in 1976_. v.,ho had been 
instrumental in passing the Amenclment Ac:t 1975 issued a clisclaimer to tlie 
Christd1urc:h Star on June the 16th, when O'Brien ·s name 1,va.s still 
suppressed, diSt:oc:iating himself and three otl1er Labour MPs ·who were 
visiting Chriskhurch from the indecency charge.162 Dr Findlay stated that he 
ha.cl not l)reacl1ed the lav.,1 by limiting t11e field of MPs by llis clisc:laimer. 
·while there is llistoric:ally a basis for the names of accused people being in 
the public domain before verdicts are reached.. this does not justify the 
practice. A reform on sitnilar lines to t11e Criminal ,8snenclment •6.c::t 1975 .. 
would protect the rigllts of an accused person and their family v.,ithout 
si2'nific:ant1v affedinQ· the other reasons for tlie Public:itv Principle. as the •::a I r~ I • 
rest of the proceeding V·lOUld still be public. It v.,ould also ensure that the 
presumption of innocence •0.ras upl1elcl.: and U1at people ~ .. 1,110 v..rere ac:quittecl 
v,,ere not punishe(l by publicity 
If this reform vv-ra.s adopted it would be substantia.lly v.,eatened if lv1:P~. 
persisted in abusing their parliainentary privilege l)y breaclling suppression 
orders by naming defendants in Parliament. 
This happened in 19.~a when Mr Piolger l1·'1P made public the name of a man 
charged in relation to allegecl Inlancl Revenue Department fraud. ancl tlrnt of 
another man c:t1a.rged VvTith conspiring to defraud the department and Mr 
160 "Cha1·ges e.gainst ne1:rspepers a11d TV2 (:8.lled ·a.ce.demic'" The Pt·ess 
26/11176. 
161 At,ove n160. 
162 "Dr Findlay: A reply" Chns:tchurch Sta1· 18/6/76. 
Banl~s MP name(l a Justice Department employee who was charged v,ith 
offensive behaviour. 
The standard t,:) t)e satisfied before a permanent name suppression order 
-r,,\lill be granted is substantially higher as the off ender has been convicted 
and in most cases should bear tlie consequen,::es of tlieir action . Usually a 
permanent order v.,1ould only be granted in exceptional circumstances where 
publicity ,;Noul(l tie 11ighly clamaging to tlw clefenclant or tlle clefenclant's 
family . 
',
0lhile publicity as a punishment is one of the reasons for the Publicity 
Principle, it is not applied on an equal basis. Tllis conflicts ,;Nitl1 tlw 
constitu.t1onal principle that everyone is equal before the lav1. I· the amount 
of publicity tliat a particular person is likely to receive means that they are 
Punished to a much ~reater extent than ,Nould ordinarilv be th& (ase. this u • . 
may justify a permanent name suppression order. 
b) T.be Names t>f the Witnesses 
The suppression of tlie names of vv'ibwsses in proceedings is governed t1y 
section l 3i:3(2)(b) of the Criminal Justice Act 19.35, rather than section 14016:!; _ 
Tllis suggests that an order suppressing the names of witnesses, can only be 
made in the circumsta.nces set out in section 13,e._i 64 It is not clear v1hy the 
legislature clealt v1it11 suppression of 1Nitnesses· names in this ',Nay_. but it 
cloes mean that there is a greater restriction on judge's povv•ers to grant these 
orders. 
16"3 Section 140 of the Crimmal Justice Act 1985 states that it applies only 
,;;;;.rhen the name suppression pov:rer he.s not been expressly dealt ~li th 
elsev:.-:here. As section 138 specifically deals with the suppression of witnesses 
names this 'f,/OUld take precedence over sl 40. 
164 See above .. Part III (A)(l :L 
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i·. more recent case which ...,Nas similar to the New Zealand c:ase T..9JT.J101t 65 is 
A tf;.'JfD&}'~--1..°~D&f.'i.lv l&v&4~·'f='f hf..1g.12in&.166 The case concern eel a contempt of 
court charge in respect of the putilic:ation of t11e name of a ..... ~.ritness v,,hich had 
been the subject of a suppression order. The contempt charge dicl not 
succeed as the court order had not been clear enough, but the decision to 
suppress the name of the witness \.Vets upheM. 
Lore! Diploc:k believed that the 1v1agistrates had the authority t(i orcler the 
suppression, as the ot11er alternative would have been for the evidence of to 
be heard in camera.167 Lord Diploct ielt that suppressing the Tmtness· name 
, ... ,as a "much less (jrastic: derogation from the principle of open justic:e"_l 63 
It is clear that a court should where possible use narne suppression orders, 
or suppression of evidence orders to circumvent the need for in camera 
hearings. This i:; in accordance v,.rit.11 tlw Publicity Principle as in camera 
hearings are obv10usly the greatest infringement on the public 
administration of justice. 
t':) Tbe N3.me t,f !.be Vit-:fj.m 
The suppression of vidims· names i::; not expres::;ly dealt v,,1it11 in the Criminal 
Justice i·.c:t 19.::S'.\ except ...,Nith regard to alleged sexual off enc.es. Generally 
section 140 states t11at tlw court has tl1e pov,ler to suppress t11e name of t11e 
accused or "of any other person connected 1Nitl1 the proceedings", ...,Nhic:h 
presumably v,.rould include the victim. 
Section 1.39 of tlie Criminal Justice ,A.et. 1985 states that in cases of se:xual 
nff ences a,c;iainst :;ed.ions 12 f, t() 142i1• of the Crimes i\ct 1961 there 1s a - . 
restriction on publication of the name of the victim (or alleged victim), or 
any name or particulars ,Nhich v.lould lead to their identification. There is an 
at)solute prohil:>ition if the offence is against section 1.30 or 1.31 of t11e Crimes 
.A.et_. or vv1iere the victim is under sixteen years of age. 
165 Above nl 12 as dis(usse<l above in Pa1·t III(A) (1) (b) (iv). 
166 Above n 15. 
1
,.., 
01 Above nlS .. 4~,1 . 
16ci Above n15 .. 451. 
If the offence is not against section 130 or 131, the court has the cliscretion 
t) auo,,q publication. Tl1e focus of tl1is section is therefore the reverse of the 
Publicity Principle~ here the general rule is for suppression of anything that 
may iclentify the victim. Tl1e onus is on the person wishing to publish to 
persuade the court to a.llov.,1 them to publish. 
In cases of sexual offending the public interest is best servecl by suppression 
to protect the victim (especially if a cl1ild is involved), even if this 
necessitates the suppression of the offender's name. There is no reason why 
t11e victim ·f; name stiou.lcl be published, and suppression in this instance ijoes 
not infringe to any large extent on the principle of public justice. 
For the sake of practicality it is easier if the names of victims are not 
suppressed, l)ut t11ere coulcl l)e a reform in tl1is area so that if the victim of 
any offence did not V-lish tJ) be narnecl, then suppression cou.lcl be obtaine,:l. 
There is no justification for publishing the victim's name, and a restriction on 
the publication v,1ould not offend the rationale of the Publicity Principle. 
B) SUPPRESSION I THE CIVIL AREA 
In tl1e c:ivil area tlle courts llave an inllerent juriscliction to make any onler 
necessary ior the administration of justice, including orders suppressrng 
certain information and orders tA) hold hearings in carnera169_ 
¥lllile the povv'er is less frequently used tl1an in the criminal area .. it is very 
Vlic:le by allcYv'yTing any type of order t0 be m;::1.de. Ho~,vever the 
c:irc:urnstances Vlhere orders can be macle are probably rnore limited tl1an 
those given in section 136 of the Criminal Justice Act 19e)5 in the criminal 
area or under Article 14. In civil cases or,jers can only be made where tliey 
are necessary ior the administration of justice. Even with ;:1. generous 
interpretation of this phrase it ~Nould be cliff icult to include within it the 
public morals or the interests of the private lives of the parties. 
A common example of Vlhen suppression is necessary for the administration 
of justice is ~Nhere courts hear in camera, applications for cases t::, be heard 
in camera or applications ior injunctions. Usually if the reasons for requiring 
C-f:, ·'rf:,,''l 1· 11 ·-1 .-..• ,~,,:, T ITAt-,,:, 11-1~· ·-1,:,, r l'l' 11<: tl-!P.1-A T. '() 1 '11 'l 1-,A f"l ' ) p ,,1· r-1t 1· n1 tl-1f> ~--.. r•A 1),:::.1· nP ·-' -· I._. _. ,. i C.. 1v•:,.::, v 'I, ·-· ·-· C.\ t_ v I) J. ) _. _. _. , . '/'/ • L 1, _ ·-· .l, 1, _.I, • _. _. •._. (.\ .:) y I_ ·-· O 
lT·"'T)t 1' r 1,.11·r1cl ~1()·-·u.,j ,-1., ·'1-;-- I11 t1-1° ,,~1 .~~ ('1- ,~(, 'ln.::. r'nf.:.t'r>t';=.~ r f,r/ TT ,·-;,,,,.,r-11tr,,:Jt' .... t;"I_ -· ~Jt:?'lJ l_. • -:•O::::-'., '.. l_Jl) .::, . -· 'v" ._.1: • ..:•t::' j 4l.J'{{1.i"'~-;- .L.·.f.J l"l. • .J l1,F.J .J.;, '\. . ... , ..1..· i."I. ... y ~ -·L/.J.J.:, L t.J.J.J ... ... 
(J . .?Ul}c.h'l 70 tl1e application for an injunction t,:) re~;train publication of matter 
prejudicial to a fair trial of another action ~Nas ordered to be held in camera 
otl1ervlise tlie injunction would liave been renclerecl futile. 
In the case of Bt?ti-fP-&l} A c1.t1d Y&Z171 it viras held that it v,,1as not nec:essary 
for the administration of justice for a case to be. heard in camera because the 
(lefendant ~N-as "in a state of cl1ronic pathological anxiety .... due to a fear of 
publicity" Vlllic:h could result in her evidence being unrellable ancl incoherl?nt 
if the court viras open.172 
169 for example see Ska-p.e- Eti t&t:c•rises Ltd v [.atisli"mer .Council [ 1973 ] 2 NZLR 
399. 
170 Above n169. 
171 .tietrr--e-&tl A s.n.f l'~tZ Unreported. Timru·u registry Appsl 12/87 
172 Above nl 71.. 2 8!ld 7. 
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In the English case ·-;f SfY>tt v .:f(t)tt 1 73 Viscount Haldane LC held that the 
application of the inherent jurisdiction did not depend on judicial discretion 
l)ut on tlie clemands of justice.174 Hov,1ever the Earl of Halsbury tliOught t11at 
the povver vva..s V.:>o Vv'lde and coulcl be misused, as individual judges would 
have different opinions as to when "the paramount object could not be 
a.tta.ined without a secret hearin2'. "175 
w 
The danger of the courts using their powers uncler the inherent ju.risdi<:tlon 
was evidenced in the .. ·~f.i1.Hst,'""[ (>f p,,:)Ji'?.l£'./J A.l/~'f.1Is v B"&11.,<0L~l _176 This case 
<, • 
concerned an appeal against interlocut()fY orders made in the High Court by 
Chil\o\lell J at t11e outset of a l1earing of an application for judicial reviev,1. Tlie. 
orders vvere ti:) protect the confidentiality of some of the applicant's 
evidence. The orders allowed an affidavit and an annexure to be given to t11e 
judge_. and the applicant's counsel to address a communication to the judge in 
a seale(j envelope, ~Nitl1out tt1e other party t,eing allov1,e(l to view t11e 
evidence or the submissions. The reason for the orders was the applicant's 
submission that if the evidence came t) the attention of the Indian 
Gr:Jvernment, the person v?ho sent it to the applicant v,,ould be "in real danger 
of arrest, tmture or deat.11 . "177 
The order is particularly dracoman as it gives the opposing case no chance to 
challenge the evidence or the submissions. This breaches the principles of 
Natural Justice as only one side of tt1e case v.,;ras heanj on tliese aspects. The 
Court of l·.ppt:?.al held that this was a miscarriage of just1ee. Woodhouse P 
agreed that courts had the power, under their inherent jurisdic:tJ.on, to adopt 
"[e ]xceptional steps of a procedural kind ... 1Nhere this is essEc-ntial in the 
interests of justice", but stated tt1at none of t11e authority cite,j "involves the 
objectionatile and irregular influence of listening only to one side."178 
173 Above n:i. 
174 Abo·ve nS, 435. 
175 Above n5 .. 442-443. 
1 7 6 Jlini~rt5r oI.Foreign Af.{B.irs v ,1..9,enipB.l [ 1984 ] 1 NZLR 758. 
177 Above n176 .. 760. 
1 78 Above nl 76 . 763 
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It would appear that tlie courts inherent jurisdictions no~N litnited so t11at 
courts cannot allov.,7 evidence to be admitted which is to remain secret even 
from t11e other party. However_. the fact that such al)uses can occur suggests 
that Parliament should legislate t(i give the courts some guidelines as to the 
types of ord,s.rs t11at can be made. Guidelines could also l)e given as t0 the 
circumstances in ~..vhic:h such orders should be made, but, as is illustrated in 
the criminal area_. these types of guiclelines are so broad as t::, l)e almost 
rneaningless . 
CONCLUSION 
There is a general principle in New Zealand that justice shou.ki l)e 
admmistJ:?red, openly and 111 public. Tllis Publicity Principle gained 
constitutional status with the ratification of tlle Intf.?rnational Convention on 
Civil and Political Rights. Tlle principle hinges on the right of access to court 
proceeclings by the puNic: and the meclia. 
The paramount reason for the Publicity Principle is that it ensures that 
justice is done, betv,.1een the parties, and on a much larger scale. It also 
ensures that t11e public has some access tJ.) the lavv' that is appliecl t>y tlie 
courts as Vv'ell as tlle la~v that is enacted by our legislature. The open 
admini::tration of justice gives the courts a level of public accountability, 
'v'v'hicll increases the public's trust in the system. 
There are some areas of lavv< to vv11ich the rationale for the principle may 
substantially apply, but there are otller factors which override its 
application. i·i just system must have the ilexibility t::;. account for these 
factors. In Ne~.,1.1 Zealand alternative justice systems have been estaNished for 
the resolution of farnily· mattf.?rs, and for juvenile offenders. 
Sometimes justice cannot be done unless there are exceptions made tJ the 
Publicity Principle. Certainly in general justice should t>e seen to t)e done, 
hov.,.'ever it is not always necessary that justice is seen, f.-x it to be done 
There are situations where lirnits irnposed on the openness of court 
proceedings_. are the fairer and more equitable alternative. 
In tlle civil area the court's powers t() grant suppression orders fall v,1ithin 
the court's inherent jurisdiction and any type of order can be made if it is 
nec:essarv for the administration of justice. This does leave the area open to 
' 
al)u.se and it may l)e time for Parliament to consider codifying Uie court's 
povlers 111 tllis area. Hovlever. applications for suppres'.;ion order~; and 111 
camera llearings are not 3S common in the civil area and the dangers of ,_, 
abuse are not so serious. 
In the criminal area the Criminal Justice Act l 9f,:, revised the statutory 
provisions dealing vvith tlle court's powers to suppress information relating 
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t) criminal cases. The nevv provisions were enacted as a total substitute for 
the common lav1.r inherent jurisdiction which the courts previously exercised. 
Limits ~Nere placed on the types of orclers available .. tiut t11e situations -r;,,vl1ere 
orders can l)e rnade -r;Nere l(ept so broad as to hinge totally on precedent 
cases and judicial discretion. It is not realistic however for tl1e le·t:='islature w 
J ' 
lay dov,m a test for the exercise of these pov,,1ers as each case varies to such a 
great extent. 
The provisions did successfully deal wit.11 many of the issues v,,1hich had been 
raised in the courts. Problems v.,1hich remain are unlikely to be solved t,y 
further enactments as they are the proNems '1A.'l1icl1 are inherent in any area 
of the lavv' v,1here juxtaposed fundamental constitutional principles must l)e 
balanced. Here tlle principles of t11e freedom of speech and of tlle press, and 
the concept of the open and public justice system must be reconciled ~Nith 
the principles t11at everyone is entit.lecl to a fair trial. is to l)e innocent until 
proven guilty and is entitled t1) basic privacy. Principles of suc:t1 paratnt'..)Unt 
concern are l)ound t1.) cause prot,lems in areas where they are in conflict. 
In the criminal :Jrea there are often compelling reasons -r;,qhy judges sl1oulcl 
grant interim name supprE:-ssion for the accused, and these reasons •':'.an far 
outv,.1eigh t11e publi( interest in allowing publication. The effects of publicity 
can be a very severe punishment Vlhich is not imposed by Parliament and 
the courts under our law, ancl 'Nhicl1 (an effect people before tt1eir (ase has 
been decide(!. The presumption of innocence has been disregarded 111 this 
arE:-a. 
It has l)een estaNislie(l in t11e family lavv> area t11at t11ere are c:onsiclerations 
vv'hich overrule the opE>nnes~: of our 1ust1ce :;ystem .. :31J(:h as privacy It is time 
tllat this policy 1:.Nas taken further to protec:t the individual interests of 
accused before convictions are entered. 
In general New Zealand law (loes comply Vv'lt11 the requirements laid down .__, 
by i-.rticle 14( 1 ). However, Parliament sl1ould not rest easy as there are 
areas of the court system in which reform is necessary if the Publicity 
Principle is to remain an instrument of the fair administration of justice. 
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